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ABSTRACT 
The study establishes that the presence of charismatic effect in terrorist or 
insurgent groups tends to make them more violent. Bradley’s theory forms the 
backbone of the study; it focuses on identifying a charismatic effect in a group, 
measuring the level of the charismatic effect, and analyzing how the dimensions 
of the effect relate to the survivability or viability of the led groups. The theory 
envisages that endogenous interaction between two relational elements in a 
social group, “flux or communion” and “control or power structure” are 
responsible for the creation and sustenance of charismatic effect. The theory 
also discovers that an imbalance in the presence of flux and control leads to 
charismatic instability. Based on theoretical dimensions, as well as an 
exploratory analytic technique involving quantitative ratings, the study has 
estimated Al Qaeda’s systemic state on two key theoretical variables and has 
suggested possible counter-strategies to negate the undesirable effects of 
charisma in Al Qaeda. The study concludes that there is a strong presence of 
charismatic effect in Al Qaeda and suggests that by manipulating the level of the 
flux and control of Al Qaeda, we may be able to reduce its ability to cause 
violence or disruption.         
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I. AL QAEDA AS A CHARISMATIC PHENOMENON 
A. INTRODUCTION 
“God Almighty hit the United States at its most vulnerable point. … I swear 
by Almighty God who raised the heavens without pillars that neither the United 
States nor he who lives in the Unites States will enjoy security before we can see 
it as a reality in Palestine and before all the infidel armies leave the land of 
Muhammad, may God’s peace and blessing be upon him.”1 The most wanted 
man on the world terror list, Osama bin Laden, was referring to nineteen men, 
well educated in Western institutions from the Middle East (ME) and other 
Muslim nations, unquestioningly hurling themselves along with their abducted 
aircrafts into the two majestic towers of the World Trade Center and  the 
Pentagon building. The attack was in a series of many others believed to have 
been perpetuated by the “bin Laden brotherhood,” but without any parallel in the 
past. Most would term the attacks an act committed by religious bigots or 
fanatics. However, is that the only rational explanation for their act, or is there 
more than what meets the eye? Many scholars, such as Post and Ingram, 
explain this act as a result of a charismatic leader, Osama bin Laden.”2  
While the awesome power of charisma is well established, its association 
with radical social movements such as terrorism and insurgencies is 
underexplored and needs further academic inquiry. This study attempts to 
establish the relationship between charisma and radical social movements such 
as terrorism and insurgencies in general, and Al Qaeda in particular, drawing on 
theories of charisma and social movements. 
                                            1 Anonymous, Through our Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future 
of America, 1st pbk ed. (Washington, D.C: Brassey's, 2003), ix. 
2 H. J. Ingram, "Tracing the Evolutionary Roots of Modern Islamic Radicalism and Militancy," 
(2008), 516; Jerrold M. Post, The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA 
to Al-QaedaPalgrave Macmillan, 2007), 220, 
http://isbndb.com/d/book/the_mind_of_the_terrorist_a01 (accessed December 26, 2008). 
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B. SCOPE AND PURPOSE 
This exploratory thesis has selected a definition and framework of 
charisma as it applies to radical social movements, in general, and terrorist 
organizations, in particular. It then examines the relationship between charisma 
and the growth of the radical movement, “Al Qaeda.” More specifically, it 
explores whether charisma may be responsible for the exponential increase in 
violence perpetuated by Al Qaeda.  If this can be established, it then seeks to 
identify strategies that security forces of the United States and other armies of 
the world could use to combat charisma-induced terrorism.   
C. BACKGROUND AND RELATIONSHIP OF CHARISMA WITH 
TERRORISM AND INSURGENCIES  
1. Definition by Weber 
Protestant theologian Rudolph Sohm was the first person to propose the 
idea of charisma.3 However, Max Weber popularized the concept. He viewed 
charisma as one of three forms of authority, the other two being traditional 
(feudal) authority and legal or rational authority.4 A number of scholars suggest 
that leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi, Adolf Hitler, Martin Luther King, Winston 
Churchill, Benito Mussolini, Fidel Castro, Nelson Mandela, Jack Kennedy, and 
Eva Peron are examples of charismatic leaders.5  
2. Approaches to Charisma 
Scholars since Weber have developed an understanding of the concept of 
charisma based on two broad approaches as follows: 
                                            
3 P. Haley, The Journal of Religion  60, no. 2 (April 1980), 185, 
http://www.jstor.org/pss/1202395 (accessed August 26, 2008).  
4 Max Weber and Talcott Parsons, Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic 
Organization (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press; Falcon's Wing Press, 1947), 57–65. 
5 Greenway, H.D.S., "The Power of Charisma," http://www.boston.com/ (accessed August 25, 
2008). 
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a. Leadership and Management Approach  
There are two lines of inquiry in the leadership-management 
approach. The first views charisma to be the result of personal traits, behaviors, 
and situations, but gives primacy to personality traits. This approach looks at 
qualities that can define a charismatic leader, such as whether he or she is 
visionary, energetic, unconventional, and exemplary, and it looks at observable 
behavior in the followership, such as loyalty, devotion, or personal identification 
with the leader.6 The second line of inquiry builds on the leader–behavior theory 
by combining it with Weber’s concept of charisma. Trice and Beyer proposed that 
charisma requires the presence, to some unknown degree of: (1) a crisis; (2) a 
person of extraordinary qualities and gifts (leader); (3) a radical vision for solution 
to the crisis (possible solution to the situation); (4) a set of followers attracted to 
the leader (group); and (5) validation through success.7 For Trice and Beyer, the 
presence of a crisis is essential, which is unlike the approach taken in the first 
line of inquiry, where a crisis need not be present.   
b. Social Sciences Approach 
The second approach was developed by Weber and subsequently 
built upon by Shills, Wilson, Wolfgang, and Eisenstadt.  It looks at charisma as a 
                                            
6 R.J. House, "A Theory of Charismatic Leadership," Leadership: The Cutting Edge (1977), 
206; Jay Alden Conger and Rabindra Nath Kanungo, Charismatic Leadership in Organizations, 
Thousand Oaks, Calif.:  Sage Publications, c1998., 1998), 57–58, 
http://isbndb.com/d/book/charismatic_leadership_in_organizations_a01 (February 21, 2009); 
Bernard M. Bass, Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations (New York; London: Free 
Press; Collier Macmillan, 1985), 53–55; D. Boje, "CHARISMA," 
http://cbae.nmsu.edu/~dboje/teaching/338/charisma.htm (accessed August 26, 2008). 
7 H. M. Trice and J. M. Beyer, " Charisma and its Routinization in Two Social Movement 
Organizations," Research in Organizational Behavior 8, (1986), 113; John. N. Davis, "How is 
Charisma Routinized? A New Look at an Old Question" (PhD, Texas Tech University), 40, 
http://repositories.tdl.org/tdl/handle/2346/1011 (accessed August 26, 2008). 
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social phenomenon that brings about a radical change in a society’s status quo.8 
Bradley (1987) empirically tested this approach by examining the relational 
structure of charisma in communes.9 The salient difference between Weber’s 
formulation of charisma and that of Bradley is that while Weber gave causal 
primacy for change to charismatic beliefs only, Bradley ascribes charisma to a 
particular relational structure among group members.  
3. Relationship between Charisma and Terrorism 
My research suggests a possible relationship between charisma and 
terrorism on the following grounds: firstly, scholars such as Gurr, Kornhauser, 
Smelser, Turner and Killian have associated the exceptional growth of radical 
social movements and revolutions, such as the Cultural Revolution in China and 
Black Resistance in the U.S., to the presence of a charismatic authority.10 
Secondly, a number of scholars have speculated about the existence of charisma 
in various terrorist or insurgent movements, which have led to the radicalization 
and rapid growth of the movement. For example, Michael Scheuer notes that 
many scholars have suggested a linkage between the charisma of Osama bin 
                                            
8 Max Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers, ed. S. N. Eisenstaedt, 
1968), 313; Bryan Wilson, The Noble Savages: The Primitive Origins of Charisma and its 
Contemporary Survival, Berkeley: University of California Press, c1975., 1975), 131 (accessed 
February 21, 2009); Wolfgang Schluchter, Rationalism, Religion, and Domination: A Weberian 
Perspective (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 595; William H. Swatos Jr., "The 
Disenchantment of Charisma: A Weberian Assessment of Revolution in a Rationalized World," 
Sociological Analysis 42, no. 2 (Summer 1981), 125, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3710590. Swatos 
cites Shils as extending the concept of Weber to a new dimension where in the modern world 
charisma has become dispersed as participation in the center has extended to more and more of 
the population. 
9 Raymond Trevor Bradley, Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, 
Wholeness and Transformation (New York, N.Y: Paragon House Publishers, 1987), 71–72. 
10 As cited in Joel Andreas, "The Structure of Charismatic Mobilization: A Case Study of 
Rebellion during the Chinese Cultural Revolution," American Sociological Review 72, no. 3 (June, 
2007), 435, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1283032391&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=
PQD (accessed August 22, 2008). 
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Laden and the growth of al Qaeda.11 Thirdly, other scholars make specific 
references linking charisma and terrorist or insurgent movements. Cynthia 
Mehmood described Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale as a charismatic leader.12 
Similarly, Christopher C. Harmon’s analysis suggests that the charismatic 
authority of its supreme leader, Prabhakaran, heavily influences the Tamil Tigers 
terrorist movement.13    
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Scholars’ frequent use of the concept of charisma in the study of social 
revolutions, terrorist, and insurgent movements gives rise to the thesis question: 
 Is there a relationship between charisma and the heightened violence caused by 
terrorist or insurgent movements? A series of secondary questions follow:  
 Is there an association between charisma and the development of 
Al Qaeda and the intense violence caused by it?  
 If so, what is the nature of charisma in al Qaeda?   
 If a charismatic effect is shown to be associated with heightened 
violence caused by terrorism, are there strategies or approaches to 
reduce the power of charisma-induced terrorism and the intensity of 
violence?   
 
                                            
11 Reviewed by Michael Scheuer, "The Plotters Against America; Two New Books Disagree 
Sharply about How Big a Threat Osama Bin Laden and His Allies Pose." The Washington Post 
November 26, 2006, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1168281161&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=
PQD. 
12 Cynthia Keppley Mahmood, Fighting for Faith and Nation: Dialogues with Sikh Militants 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 77. 
13 Christopher C. Harmon, "The Myth of the Invincible Terrorist," Policy Review, no. 142 




E. METHODOLOGY  
During the course of the study, it came across very sketchy investigations 
on the impact of charisma or charismatic leadership on a terrorist movement’s 
growth and popularity. Therefore, this thesis is exploratory in nature and the 
major goals are to:  
 Provide a brief overview of the literature on charisma. I have 
selected a framework that combines all the approaches. However, 
Bradley’s theory forms the backbone of the study to identify a 
charismatic effect in a group and measure the level of the 
charismatic effect.  
 Identify the various dimensions of charisma as they apply to 
terrorist organizations, and then examine the relationship between 
charisma and violence caused by various terrorist groups. 
  Identify counter-strategies to negate the undesirable effects of 
charisma in Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.  
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS  
Chapter I provides an introduction to the topic of terrorism, presents the 
research questions, and introduces the methodology of the thesis. Chapter II 
reviews the literature on charisma. Charisma is defined, and concepts and types 
of charisma are discussed. Chapter III examines charisma as a catalytic agent of 
insurgencies and terrorism.  It studies charisma and its impact on the rise of 
violence caused by insurgencies and terrorist movements. It then suggests 
strategies to reduce the violence caused by such groups.   It examines charisma 
and radical social movement, the preconditions for the emergence of charisma 
and the indicators of charisma, the concept of charismatic stability, strategies to 
reduce charismatic effects and terrorist violence, and the operability of strategies. 
Chapter IV views Al Qaeda as “The charming-headed Hydra.”  It provides an 
overview of Al Qaeda, discusses the presence of charisma in Al Qaeda and the 
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present level of charisma in Al Qaeda. Chapter V suggests strategies to counter 
the effects of charisma in Al Qaeda. Chapter VI presents the thesis’s conclusions 
and recommendations. Appendix A and B contain the quantitative assessment 
details to arrive at the measure of two variables, “flux” and “control,” currently 
present in Al Qaeda and responsible for the creation and sustenance of charisma 
in a social group.  
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW OF CHARISMA 
A. HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING OF CHARISMA 
A number of scholars such as Nettler, Schelesinger, Etzoni, and Worsley, 
have dismissed the concept of charisma as confused and hopelessly useless.14 
Similarly, Joel Andreas states that the charismatic authority concept disappeared 
from the social movement theory as it relied on a socio-psychological explanation 
whereas the new paradigm in social movement relied more on rational and 
logical explanations for radicalism and revolutions in social settings.15 Weber, 
himself, thought of charisma as a primordial phenomenon.  
However, after reviewing the research of Andreas,16 Bradley,17 Conger 
and Kanungo,18 Trice and Beyer,19 and House,20  it is clear that this position 
needs revision. Bradley, for example, argues that without the concept of 
charisma, we are unable to account for the dramatic births and rapid 
development of modern Russia and China, or understand Germany’s awakening 
following the First World War and the Nazi invasion of Europe.21 Similarly, Joel 
Andreas maintains that “by neglecting charisma, scholars have relinquished a 
valuable tool with which to analyze these movements and have lost half of a 
conceptual framework that might profitably be used to understand the twists and 
                                            
14 As cited in Bradley, Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, 
Wholeness and Transformation, 29. 
15 Andreas, The Structure of Charismatic Mobilization: A Case Study of Rebellion during the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution, 435. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Bradley, Charisma and Social Structure:  A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and 
Transformation, 365. 
18 Conger and Kanungo, Charismatic Leadership in Organizations, 288. 
19 Trice and Beyer, Charisma and its Routinization in Two Social Movement Organizations, 
113-164. 
20 R.J. House, A Theory of Charismatic Leadership, 305-357. 
21 Bradley, Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and 
Transformation, 30. 
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turns of all social movements.”22 Given these arguments, understanding 
charisma as a social construct may be very useful in explaining the occurrence of 
radical events and terrorist movements and potentially enable us to identify 
measures to contain their adverse impacts.  
1 Weber’s Definition of Charisma 
Protestant theologian Rudolph Sohm was the first person to propose the 
idea of charisma.23 However, Max Weber popularized the concept. He viewed 
charisma as one of three forms of authority, the other two being traditional 
(feudal) authority, and legal or rational authority. Weber says that charismatic 
authority is based on the devotion to a specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism, 
or exemplary character of an individual person and of the normative patterns or 
order revealed or ordained by him.”24 This form of authority depends upon the 
recognition of the charismatic qualities (“the gift of grace”) that the leader is 
believed to posses and which have to be repeatedly “proved” to the followers. 
Therefore, legitimacy lasts only as long as the followers’ belief in charismatic 
inspirations remain.25 Weber defined charisma as: 
…. A certain quality of an individual personality of which she or he 
is “set apart” from ordinary people and treated as endowed with 
supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional 
powers or qualities. These as such are not accessible to the 
ordinary person, but are regarded as divine in origin or as 
exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is 
treated as a leader.26    
 
                                            
22 Andreas, The Structure of Charismatic Mobilization: A Case Study of Rebellion during the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution, 435. 
23 Peter Haley, "Rudolph Sohm on Charisma," The Journal of Religion 60, no. 2 (April 1980 ) 
185, http://www.jstor.org/pss/1202395 (accessed August 26, 2008). 
24 Weber and Parsons, Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, 328. 
25 Bradley, Charisma and Social Structure:  A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and 
Transformation, 32-33. 
26 Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers, 48. 
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Many consider leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi, Adolf Hitler, Martin 
Luther King, Winston Churchill, Benito Mussolini, Tony Blair, Fidel Castro, Nelson 
Mandela, Jack Kennedy, Franklin Roosevelt, Joan of Arc, and Eva Peron as 
examples of charismatic leaders.27  
2. Weber’s Types of Charisma 
a.  Pure Charisma 
Describing the varieties of charismatic experience, Weber spoke of 
a continuum ranging from "pure" to "routinized" charisma. Pure charisma is 
creative, revolutionary, and rare. It usually emerges in the very beginning of a 
social movement when a "charismatic community" coalesces around a leader.28 
Weber puts the Prophets in this category and includes war heroes such as 
Napoleon. Since this form of charisma necessarily resides in the leader, it is also 
referred to as “charisma of person.”29 
b.  Routinized Charisma  
Weber says that as a revolutionary force, charismatic authority is 
an instrument for social change. The unstable and temporary nature of the 
charismatic phenomenon creates a problem of leadership succession, which 
requires the transformation of charismatic authority into either a traditional or a 
rational legal type. Routinized charisma describes the transformation of a 
leader’s charisma into either traditionalized or rationalized form or a combination 
of both. By traditionalization and rationalization, Weber implied that the new order 
established by a charismatic leader is transformed into one that functions by 
rules and regulations. The administrative staffs around the charismatic 
personality or his followers generally carry out this transformation to preserve 
their personal interests and power. This happens when a leader’s charisma 
                                            
27 H.D.S Greenway, "The Power of Charisma," http://www.boston.com/ (accessed August 25, 
2008). 
28 Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers, 54. 
29 Weber and Parsons, Max Weber:  The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, 76. 
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disappears or after he has died. In this category, Weber gives examples of the 
selection of the Dalai Lama and filling up of Roman magistracies.30  Oftentimes, 
this form of charisma resides in the office or position; therefore, it is also referred 
to as charisma of office.31 Figuratively we can depict Weber’s model of charisma 
as shown in Figure 1 below.  
                   
 
Figure 1.   Weber's Model of Charisma in Social Group 
c. Approaches to the Concept of Charisma 
After Weber, scholars developed the concept of charisma from two 
broad approaches. The first approach is from a management and leadership 
perspective and the second from the social sciences perspective. The 
management perspective accords causal primacy for the emergence of 
charismatic effects to the personality attributes of the leader of a group; the social 
sciences perspective considers the emergence of charisma to be the sum total 
effect of the social group, leader, and the social context.  
d. Leadership and Management Approach 
As highlighted above, the leadership theory proponents consider 
traits as the primary cause for the emergence of a charismatic phenomenon. 
There are two lines of inquiry in the leadership-management approach. 
 The first views charisma as the result of personal traits, 
behaviors, and situations but gives primacy to personality traits. This approach 
                                            
30 Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers, 54–55. 
31 Weber and Parsons, Max Weber: The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, 76. 
 13
looks at qualities that can define a charismatic leader such as having visionary, 
energetic, unconventional, and exemplary characteristics, or by observing 
behaviors in the followership, such as loyalty and devotion, personal identification 
with the leader, desire to be like the leader, self-esteem based on relationship 
with the leader, and trust in the leader.32 Kanungo and Conger have even 
developed a model to measure these attributes in a leader to categorize him as 
charismatic or non-charismatic.33 
 The second builds on leader–behavior theory by combining it 
with Weber’s concept of charisma. Trice and Beyer proposed that charisma 
requires the presence, to some unknown degree of: (1) a crisis; (2) a person of 
extraordinary qualities and gifts (leader); (3) a radical vision for solution to the 
crisis (possible solution of the situation); (4) a set of followers attracted to the 
leader (group); and (5) validation through success.34 Interestingly, Trice and 
Beyer also looked at the process of routinization of charisma. They empirically 
observed data collected over a twenty year period, comparing the success of 
charismatic leaders where charisma was routinized as indicated by: (1) 
administrative apparatuses developed for putting missions into practice; (2) rites 
and ceremonials that transferred and transformed the charisma to others; (3) 
messages and missions that were incorporated into written and/or oral traditions; 
and, (4) where the organization had selected a successor to serve as a 
reincarnation of the charismatic and to support the charismatic's mission.35 
                                            
32 R.J. House, A Theory of Charismatic Leadership, 206; Conger and Kanungo, Charismatic 
Leadership in Organizations, 57–58; Bass, Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations, 
53-55; D. Boje, CHARISMA. 
33 Jay A. Conger and others, "Measuring Charisma: Dimensionality and Validity of the 
Conger-Kanungo Scale of Charismatic Leadership," Revue Canadienne Des Sciences De 
l'Administration 14, no. 3 (September 1997), 290, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=23208196&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQ
D (accessed August 22, 2008). 
34 As cited in John. N. Davis, How is Charisma Routinized? A New Look at an Old Question. 
35 Trice and Beyer, Charisma and its Routinization in Two Social Movement Organizations, 
summarized. 
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e. Social Sciences Approach to Charisma  
The debate over the existence and the exact nature of charisma in 
a social setting has taken place in academia from Sohm and then Weber to 
current scholars such as Wilson, Shils, Schluchter, and Bradley. Wilson, in his 
essay, “The Noble Savages,” contends that charisma is an attribute of a 
traditional social organization. He argues that it emerges under primitive 
psychological and social conditions and dies out as modernization takes place.36 
However, his position stands on a weak pedestal as charismatic personalities are 
emerging even in the modern era. Charles P. Cell categorizes thirty-four heads of 
states as charismatic personalities, the prominent ones being Roosevelt, Tito, 
Nehru, Jinnah, Khrushchev, Castro, and Nasser.37 Shils provides yet another 
perspective by arguing that “… charismatic sensitivity can slumber within the 
rational-legal and traditional legitimations of authority." 38 What he implies is that 
charisma does exist in the modern world but in a routinized form as charisma of 
office. The sheer size, complexity, and power of a modern, bureaucratic 
organization engender, in the individual, a sense of mystical wonder and awe 
toward omnipotent systems.39 
Schluchter is another social science scholar who explains charisma 
from a theory of action perspective and accords primacy to charismatically 
relevant situations for the emergence of charisma. These situations are those of 
an inner crisis, in which life loses meaning. In short, they are situations of 
existential threat in a society.40  
                                            
36 As cited in Bradley, Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, 
Wholeness and Transformation, 41. 
37 Charles P. Cell, "Charismatic Heads of State: The Social Context," Cross-Cultural 
Research 9, no. 4 (1974), 255 (accessed November 10, 2008). 
38 As cited in Swatos, The Disenchantment of Charisma: A Weberian Assessment of 
Revolution in a Rationalized World, 124. 
39 As cited in Bradley, Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, 
Wholeness and Transformation, 41. 
40 Schluchter, Rationalism, Religion, and Domination: A Weberian Perspective, 595. 
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While the above scholars were largely elaborating on Weber’s 
formulation of charisma, Bradley observed certain theoretical contradictions in 
Weber’s concept of charisma. Weber had postulated that charismatic 
phenomenon in a social group is an unstable state, tending towards 
bureaucratization, institutionalization, and/or traditionalization, since it does not 
depend upon rationalization and routine means for sustenance of the group.41 
However, Bradley says that this is theoretically untenable since an organization 
cannot survive without a rationalized and efficient organizational foundation that 
not only provides for basic needs, but can also withstand problems and 
challenges from outside. In addition, charisma needs to respond not only to the 
status quo (i.e., a response in the past), but may also emerge as the future poses 
new needs in a social setting or society or an organization.42 The salient 
difference between Weber’s formulation of charisma and Bradley’s is that while 
Weber gave causal primacy for change to charismatic beliefs only, Bradley 
ascribes charisma to a particular relational structure among group members. The 
relational structure in a collectivity creates power, which leads to influence over 
the social group, causing the group to undertake a social transformation as 
shown in Figure 2 below. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Relationship of Charisma and Social Change 
B. PERSPECTIVE ON CHARISMA FOR THE STUDY 
Bradley’s concept of charisma differs slightly from Weber’s and other 
scholars. Because it rests on strong empirical evidence, the study discusses his 
concept in slightly more detail and uses it as the foundation for this study. First, 
                                            
41 Bradley, Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and 
Transformation, 38. 
42 Ibid., 47. 
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the study provides a brief overview of Bradley’s theory of charisma and then 
selects a definition for various important terms associated with charisma.  
1. Bradley’s Theory of Charisma 
a. Relational Approach to Study of Charisma 
Weber’s model of charisma accords causal primacy to the 
charismatic belief.  Bradley challenges this and says that although charismatic 
belief does play a part in the emergence of charisma, it is the relationship 
between the members of the group that holds the key to the charismatic 
phenomenon.  Two relational patterns involved in this process became evident 
as the reason for the emergence of charismatic effect in a group. These 
relational patterns are, first, “a system of communion in the group” and second, 
“a strong collective power.” Bradley empirically tested both these variables in his 
research.  
b. Love and Power—The Relational Variables of Charisma 
Communion in a charismatic group creates an intense emotional 
bond that fuses the group into an undifferentiated whole and liberates the energy 
previously locked up as structure.”43 Communion builds strong bonds of 
attachment and commitment among the group members. Empirically, a densely 
interlocking pattern of highly charged bonds of positive affect was found in his 
study of charismatic communes, varying directly with the intensity of charismatic 
leadership. This communion is built from fraternal love, optimism, and, for the 
resident charismatic groups, an element of euphoria. Fraternal love is 
experienced as an intense bond of brotherhood.44  Optimism is a strong, positive 
feeling about the future. This follows from the belief in the efficacy of charismatic 
leadership as the means to achieve the desired utopia, which can remain even 
                                            
43 Bradley, Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and 
Transformation, 70. 
44 Ibid., 111. 
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after the failure of a charismatic leader to deliver.45 The third element of 
communion is an exuberant bond of euphoria. This reflects the awe and 
excitement over the direct experience of the energizing power of the charismatic 
leader. This sense of euphoria is relatively less in absentee charismatic groups. 
All three relational elements of communion fuse individual members into a 
cohesive, collective unity. However, the communion forged by these three 
relational bonds is highly unstable, likely to destabilize the group, even leading to 
its demise. To survive under these conditions, a charismatic group requires a 
strong Power Structure,46  which tends to manifest itself as a transitive hierarchy 
of densely interlocking relations. For example, the power structure in a 
charismatic group tends to be more coherent: a single non-disjointed, 
multileveled, transitive hierarchy of direct and indirect ties, with virtually everyone 
connected to the charismatic leader.47 Bradley says, “the power structure not 
only provides a means for controlling communion, but also as a key element in 
the economic and routine organization that meets every day sustenance needs, it 
(power) is an imperative for long term survival.” 48 Power also caters to the 
material, emotional, and social needs of the members on a regular basis by 
creating structure in the form of differentiation of social positions and roles 
organized around the fulfillment of these needs. Thus, we tend to find clearly 
articulated power structures in charismatic systems. Bradley also refers to this as 
a “collective power structure,” the purpose of which is to harness the energy, 
aligning and channeling it to achieve collective ends.49 Ultimately, the relational 
elements of power translate into unquestioning obedience to the holder of 
charisma by the members of the group resulting in relatively less inter-member 
 
                                            
45 Bradley, Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and 
Transformation, 112. 
46 Ibid., 280–81. 
47 Ibid., 281. 
48 Ibid., 70, 71. 
49 Ibid., 72, 281–282. 
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rivalry in a charismatic group. Similarly, the relational element of love translate to 
a sense of reverence and devotion to the holder of charisma by the members of 
the group. 
Bradley cautions that a fine balance between love and power is 
necessary  to achieve stability in a charismatic group.  If there is balance 
between love and power, then the group displays extreme cohesion and has the 
capacity to sustain itself and accomplish its goals and objectives. On the other 
hand, a lack of balance between love and power in the group renders the group 
unstable and leads to its dissolution. Bradley identifies low survival rates in the 
short term for charismatic groups but a high rate of survival in the long term, if the 
group crosses a critical point in its lifecycle.50 This point occurs because, in the 
initial stages of a charismatic group’s existence, it struggles to master the 
technique of harnessing the high amount of energy produced due to the 
communion, which leads to a high rate of failure. However, if the group manages 
to master the art of controlling this energy by developing a collective power 
structure, then the group manages to survive. The point in the lifecycle of a group 
when it achieves this form of love—power balance is critical for its survival and 
stability. As a corollary to this, if we somehow disrupt this balance, then the group 
would dissolve or self-destruct. Figure 3 depicts Bradley’s model of charisma. 
 
                                            
50 Bradley, Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and 
Transformation, 174. 
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Figure 3.   Model Showing Social Organization of Charisma 
c. The Details of the Study 
Bradley validated his theory through empirical tests on fifty-seven 
charismatic and non-charismatic communes in the United States extending over 
a period of two years from 1974 to 1975, utilizing the methodology of a social 
network analysis. Altogether, a total of 566 adults, fifteen years and older, formed 
communes ranging in size from five to sixty-seven members.. The communes 
were comprised of both men and women, with men being slightly more in number 
than the women. To measure charisma, a qualitative procedure was developed 
comprising ethnographic data collection, sociometric questionnaires, interviews, 
and independent validation through field workers. This procedure led to twenty-
eight communes being classified as charismatic and twenty-nine as non-
charismatic.51  
d. Structural Basis of Charismatic Group and Its 
Typologies 
Bradley says that there are two normative elements of the social 
relationships that help locate the structural base of charisma in a social group. 
This structural base helps in classifying a group as either charismatic or non-
                                            







charismatic. The first is the  collective belief that a particular individual possesses 
talents, powers, or abilities that are regarded as truly outstanding or 
extraordinary. Attribution of charisma can be based on almost any human 
capability; talent in leadership does not seem to be a necessary condition. The 
followers must regard the ability as “exceptional.” The second condition is that 
the special talents or qualities are derived from a supernatural source, unlike that 
of a “virtuoso” or expert.52  
Building on Weber, Bradley then further clarifies that the existence 
of beliefs attributing charismatic qualities to an individual is not sufficient to 
establish a relationship of charismatic leadership between a collectivity and an 
individual. It is only when leadership is based directly on the exceptional non-
worldly powers attributed to an individual that charisma exists. He uses Bendix to 
underscore the point that charismatic rule is of two types. One is Weber’s pure 
type of charismatic domination in which “the exercise of power is bound up with a 
concrete person and his distinctive qualities.” Thus, the charisma is not 
transferable to anyone else and is known as charismatic leadership. The second 
is when charisma is “routinized” and transformed into a “depersonalized” quality.  
Benedix terms it as charismatic authority, which adheres to any incumbent of a 
position or rule that is regarded as charismatic.53  
Collapsing the two normative dimensions into one (extraordinary 
powers and the gift of grace or supernatural) and adding two relational 
dimensions (whether the rule over the collective has been instituted and whether 
the rule has been routinized), Bradley has developed two non-charismatic group 
                                            
52 Bradley, Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and 
Transformation, 279–280. Fifty-nine percent of his respondents cited at least one supernatural 
quality; only 24 percent and 17 percent said “no one” has special talents.” On the other hand, in 
the non-charismatic group; only 7 percent responded that an individual had extraordinary or 
supernatural abilities. The virtuoso has no relationship with the supernatural. Examples of 
virtuoso are Newton, Einstein, Shakespeare, Henry Ford, Thomas Edison. 
53 Ibid., 56. 
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types (referred to as low and high charismatic potential groups) and two 
charismatic group types.54 See Figure 4 below.  
 
 
Figure 4.   Typology of Charismatic Leadership 
A low charismatic group, or type 1 group, is one whose members 
do not believe that anyone in their group possesses charismatic qualities. A High 
charismatic potential or type 2 group is one whose members believe that there is 
a need for a charismatic personality in the group. The “charismatic leadership 
group” or type 3 group is one whose members believe that their leader 
possesses charismatic qualities, and his rule is established over the group. It is 
also termed “charisma of person.” Based on his analysis, he further classified the 
charismatic leadership communes into “resident charismatic groups” (i.e. where 
the leader was staying with the commune) and “absentee charismatic groups” 
(i.e. where the leader was not staying with the group). He found that the 
charismatic effect is less in an absentee charismatic group.55 (Seventy-one 
                                            
54 Bradley, Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and 
Transformation, 57. 
55  Bradley, Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and 
Transformation, 58. 
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percent of the people in resident charismatic leadership groups, and 41 percent 
in absentee charismatic groups, attributed both charismatic powers and sought 
leadership from the person they had named in the resident and absentee 
charismatic communes or groups as the leader.)56 Charismatic authority or type 
4 groups are ones in which the charismatic leadership’s rule undergoes 
routinization and is transformed into a depersonalized quality. Bradley was able 
to study the charismatic effect in all types of groups except the “charismatic 
authority” group, since no group had reached the point where the charisma had 
been depersonalized and thus could be held by any incumbent of the leadership 
position. 
C.  DEFINITIONS OF VARIOUS TERMINOLOGIES FOR THE STUDY 
 Based on the above discussions, the following terms would assist in the 
study of charisma from the perspective of Bradley, Weber, and other scholars 
referred to in the literature review: 
 Charismatic Group: Bradley defines a charismatic group as one in 
which there exists a collective belief that a particular individual 
possesses talents, powers, or abilities that are regarded as truly 
outstanding or extraordinary and that these qualities are derived 
from a supernatural source.57 
 Charismatic Rule: Bradley defines charismatic rule to be when the 
leadership of a group is based directly on the exceptional non-
worldly powers attributed to an individual.58  
 Charismatic Leadership or Charisma of Person: Bendix defines 
charismatic leadership as a personal relationship between the 
leader and the led, based on their recognition of the leader’s quality 
as a unique individual. Thus, charisma is not transferable. The 
                                            
56 Bradley, Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness and 
Transformation, 58. 
57 Ibid., 279–280. 
58 Ibid., 56 . 
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exercise of charismatic rule is bound up with a concrete person. 59 
Hereafter, to represent this type of charismatic leadership, this 
study uses the term “charisma of person.”   
 Charismatic Authority or Charisma of Position: Bendix defines 
charismatic authority as existing when charisma of person is 
“routinized” and transformed into a “depersonalized” quality. This 
form of charisma adheres to any incumbent of a position of rule that 
is regarded as charismatic. 60 Hereafter, to represent this type of 
charismatic leadership, the study uses the term “charisma of 
position.” 
 Charisma: “Charisma as a system of social transformation uses 
communion to liberate energy from existing structure, and power 
to channel and mold the energy into a new social form. Stability, 
during this delicate process, requires that these two (power and 
love) relational patterns be complementary.”61  
D. APPLICABILITY OF BRADLEY’S FORMULATION FOR THE STUDY 
Bradley’s model seems logical and workable for analyzing a charismatic 
effect in a group. However, since he validated his propositions on small 
communes (minimum of five to a maximum of sixty-seven), all located in the 
United States, its applicability for larger groupings such as terrorist and insurgent 
organizations operating in different regions of the world, and comprised of people 
of different religious and cultural origins, remains unknown. In addition, the 
communes under investigation were primarily urban, which may not be 
compatible with current international terrorist profiles. Many groups hail from 
remote areas and villages. Finally, because there were no groups with charisma 
                                            
59 Bendix as cited in Bradley, Charisma and Social Structure: A Study of Love and Power, 
Wholeness and Transformation, 56. 
60 Bendix as cited in Ibid. (56) A point to note is that even in routinized groups, charisma does 
not disappear. 
61 Ibid., 295. 
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of position in his research, charismatic characteristics of such groups could not 
be identified. Therefore, there is a need to broaden the theory of charisma to 
make it relevant for studying terrorism and radical mass movements.  This is 
done by incorporating essential aspects of Weber’s formulation related to 
routinized charisma and personal traits attributed to charismatic leaders and by 
incorporating Bradley’s theory of charisma that examines the relational structures 
of charismatic groups. In the next chapter, the impact of charisma on terrorism is 
explored using the Weber—Bradley framework of charisma. 
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III.  CHARISMA: THE CATALYTIC AGENT OF INSURGENCIES 
AND TERRORISM 
A. CHARISMA  IN RADICAL MASS MOVEMENTS  
In our quest to arrive at a rational explanation of extraordinary events, we 
have almost abandoned some essential aspects of our past studies and theories 
of collective action based on charismatic phenomena carried out by scholars 
such as Weber, Gurr, Kornhauser, Smelser, Turner and Killian, Downton, 
Friedland, Marcus, and Wallace.62 Many modern social scientists have dismissed 
Weber’s concept of charisma in social movements on the grounds of irrationality. 
But there are still others who hold to earlier beliefs that charismatic personalities 
act as pied pipers of radical social movements who  heighten the violence levels 
in such movements. For example, charismatics such as Abdullah Oclan (PKK, 
Kurdistan), Bhindranwale (Sikh, India), and Khomeini generated unprecedented 
levels of violence while they were at the helm of their movements.63  
The frequent use of charisma to explain collective behavior in the study of 
social revolutions, terrorist, and insurgent movements gives rise to the thesis 
question. What is the relationship between charisma and terrorism or 
insurgencies? The question is important because a number of terrorist and 
insurgent movements worldwide are being termed charismatic or led by 
charismatic personalities. Despite the fact that there are no focused studies that 
explore the relationship of charisma in terrorism or insurgencies, the preliminary 
survey of the literature suggests that charisma acts as a catalytic agent in 
terrorist or insurgent movements causing heightened levels of violence. This 
                                            
62 As cited in Andreas, The Structure of Charismatic Mobilization: A Case Study of Rebellion 
during the Chinese Cultural Revolution, 435. 
63 Hacaoglu Selcan, "Kurdish Rebel Leader Ocalan: Turkey's no. 1 Enemy," | Article from AP 
Online | HighBeam Research, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-19416124.html (accessed 
August 26, 2008); James Francis Rochlin, Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, 
Colombia, Mexico, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 300, 
http://isbndb.com/d/book/vanguard_revolutionaries_in_latin_america_a01 (accessed August 26, 
2008); Mahmood, Fighting for Faith and Nation:  Dialogues with Sikh Militants, 314; H.D.S 
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observation implies that if one were able to reduce or minimize a charismatic 
effect, then one would also be able to reduce the intensity of violence in the 
movement. This leads to the next question. Is it possible to minimize the 
disruptive power of charisma in a terrorist or insurgent movement? To address 
these questions, this chapter first examines the association between charisma 
and the rise of terrorist and insurgent movements including their heightened 
disruptive impact. Secondly, it identifies the preconditions for emergence and 
indicators of charisma. Thirdly, it identifies the key elements that go into ensuring 
the survivability of charismatic effects in a group. Finally, the study identifies key 
intervening points to arrive at possible strategies to minimize the catalytic power 
of charisma and thereby reduce the violence level in a radical group. 
1. The Relationship between Charisma and Social Movements 
Some scholars argue that it is difficult to explain the role of charisma in 
radical social movements because it is rooted in socio-psychological reasoning. 
They offer reasons based on “rational choice theory” for why people participate in 
highly risky and violent radical movements such as terrorism and insurgencies.  
For example, Crenshaw, while not denying a psychological explanation for 
collective behavior, argues, based on surveys conducted in New York and West 
Germany, that individuals can be collectively rational. She says, “People realize 
that their participation is important and group size and cohesion matter.”64 
Similarly, Theobald says, “The notion of charisma, of charismatic leadership has, 
on numerous occasions, been utilized to explain the upsurge and development of 
social movements of various kinds and even to explain cohesion in societies at 
large. But despite this widespread usage, there exists in the minds of some, 
strong doubts about whether the term (charisma) has any real explanatory 
                                            
64 Walter Reich, Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind 
Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; 1998., 1998), 8–9, 
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value.”65 Likewise, Worsley concluded that charisma is no more than a "sponge 
word" and is virtually useless in an analytical sense.66  Another sociologist, 
Johnson, expresses similar reservations and states, “Wherever the concept of 
revolutionary charisma is applicable, it raises a sociological problem: it merely 
identifies a phenomenon; it does not explain why certain personal qualities and 
certain “new” ideas should be so attractive and why the revolutionary movements 
succeed.”67  
Citing the example of the Cultural Revolution (CR), Mac Farquhar also 
disagrees with the commonly prevailing view that Mao’s charisma played a major 
role in the Cultural Revolution. He has argued that, “Even without Mao, the 
peculiar nature of Chinese Communism would have brought the country to CR or 
a similar calamity. The result might not have been quite as debilitating, but it still 
would have been a calamity.”68 Another political scientist, Wang, denies any role 
of charisma in CR and says, “It was essentially the fear of reprisal that led people 
to join the CR.”69 In addition, Wang identifies a lack of rigorous empirical testing 
as another difficulty with a charismatic explanation of social movements. He 
says, “It seems that something must be wrong with the conventional wisdom 
about the charismatic relationship. …, discussions of charisma have been 
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speculative in nature and almost exclusively theoretical. A notion such as "blind 
faith"—what the charismatic leader supposedly generates in his followers—has 
rarely been subjected to empirical testing.”70  
The views expressed above may give the impression that charisma has 
no relationship with radical social movements. However, there is ample and 
contemporary evidence to suggest otherwise. Three reasons in particular 
suggest a relationship between charisma and radical social movements. First, 
scholars have associated the exceptional growth of radical social movements 
and revolutions such as the Cultural Revolution in China and the Black 
Resistance in the U.S. to the presence of a charismatic leadership.71 This 
association suggests a conceptual linkage between charisma and terrorism 
because a number of features of terrorism or insurgency bear similarities to those 
of charisma. For example, charisma emerges in opposition to the existing 
authority or order;72 as do terrorist or insurgent movements whose motives are 
usually to oppose the existing political setup for creating a new order.73 Also, like 
charisma, which generally emerges in small, closed cult-like social settings, 
terrorist and insurgent movements also initially emerge in a similar manner. 
Byman says, “These groups began as small bands of terrorists who, over time, 
took on the trappings of guerrilla armies. Still other groups try to avoid relying 
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exclusively on terrorism at any stage in their development, employing small-
group guerrilla tactics in the hopes of sparking a broader rebellion.”74 In the 
context of charisma, Weber refers to this initial group as the “corporate group.”75  
The second reason is the existence of a number of speculative linkages 
between charisma and radical social movements by various scholars. Selcan 
Hacaoglu, writing in AP, refers to Abdullah Oclan a PKK terror group leader as a 
charismatic person.76Similarly, Rochlin refers to Guzman, the terrorist leader of 
the Shining Path in Peru, as charismatic.77 The founding head of the CIA's bin 
Laden unit, Michael Scheuer, states that many scholars have suggested a 
linkage between the charisma of Osama bin Laden and the growth of al Qaeda.78 
David Gompert states that, “Leaders of the global jihad are charismatic and gifted 
at strategy and unifying ideology.”79   
The third reason is the existence of focused references of charisma-
engendered terrorist or insurgent movements by some scholars. Cynthia 
Mehmood described Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale as a charismatic leader 
because the Sikh militancy in India grew into a strong movement.80 Similarly, 
Christopher C. Harmon has analyzed the Tamil Tigers’ terrorist movement and 
argued that it is heavily influenced by the charismatic authority of its supreme 
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leader, Prabhakaran.81 Likewise, Hughes and Johnson have carried out a 
detailed analysis of Abimael Guzman and concluded that Guzman was able to 
spread the myth of his charisma to mobilize the Shining Path insurgency.82  
2. Charisma and Level of Violence 
The evidence above suggests a strong relationship between charisma and 
radical movements, which leads to the next issue. What is the impact of charisma 
on such movements? Cole, through an empirical study, established that the 
presence of charisma leads to a heightened level of violence in a radical 
movement. He drew a list of sixty-seven conflicts observed by the International 
Crisis Group in its monthly Crisis Watch publication to study the impact of the 
charismatic state and non-state actors involved in a conflict. The data covers the 
period from the end of the Cold War in 1990 to the present.  After having 
identified the key players, each actor was searched in open source databases 
and the Internet to make a qualitative and a quantitative assessment of whether 
the leaders involved in the conflict were charismatic or not. The qualitative 
assessment, which was inherently subjective, involved certain keywords used by 
the media to describe the leaders or the use of language that the leaders made 
in their press conferences, speeches, and writings. The frequency of descriptions 
in the media as “charismatic” formed the basis of quantitative assessment. An 
“armed conflict” was defined as a political conflict involving the killing of at least 
1,000 people, or violence leading to a substantial refugee outflow or population 
displacement.  
The important findings of the study were that, “90.3 percent (28 out of 31) 
of armed conflicts had one or more charismatic leader; and nearly 50 percent (15 
out of 31) of armed conflicts involved an interaction between a Charismatic State 
Leader (CSL) and a Charismatic Non State Leader (CNSL). Of the twenty-one 
conflicts involving CSL and CNSL, 71.4 percent (15 out of 21) were violent. Only 
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36.8 percent (7 out of 19) of the conflicts involving a CSL only were violent; and 
54.5 percent (6 out of 11) of the conflicts involving a CNSL only were violent.” 83  
The findings highlight that twice as many conflicts involving CSL and CNSL were 
violent than when there was only one form or the other present in a conflict. Very 
few conflicts are violent in the absence of either type of charismatic leadership. 
As such, analysts seeking to “predict” when a protracted conflict is likely to turn 
violent should note that it (the conflict) turns violent when grievances long held 




Figure 5.   Impact of Charisma on Terrorism and Insurgencies and 
Suggested Approach to Deal with the Impact 
The Cole study clearly establishes that charisma acts as a catalyst and 
magnifies the violence level in a movement. Figure 5 depicts the impact of 
charisma on terrorism. Since the presence of a charismatic effect leads to 
increases in the violence level, then a reduction of charismatic effect should lead 
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to a reduction in the intensity of violence by the movement. Traditionally, we 
focus on terrorism to reduce violence, but based on this observation, this study 
suggests that we address the charismatic effect in the movement to reduce the 
increased level of violence. See Figure 5.  
B. PRECONDITIONS FOR EMERGENCE AND INDICATORS OF 
CHARISMA  
In order to address the charismatic effect, we need to identify the points of 
intervention in a charismatic phenomenon, but to identify the points of 
interventions, we need to understand how is it created and sustained in a terrorist 
group. For the creation of charisma in a radical movement, certain preconditions 
are essential.  
Preconditions that favor the emergence of charisma in terrorist 
movements are firstly, the presence of a severe crisis or prolonged undesirable 
status quo within both the individual and collective identities of a group.84 
Secondly, the presence of a leader with charismatic attributes that the followers 
recognize as exceptional and consequently inspire them to follow him with a 
sense of awe, hope, and faith.85 Divine power and not virtuosity provides 
miraculous abilities to the charismatic.86  In addition, some personality attributes 
commonly associated with a charismatic are that he or she is visionary, 
persuasive, has mesmerizing oratory, and has a prophetic appearance.87 Thirdly, 
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the leader offers a compelling solution to the crisis, usually rooted in religion or 
culture or a customized ideology, or all of these, which may call upon the 
followers to resort to increased violence.88  When these preconditions interact 
with each other in a radical social movement, a charismatic effect may emerge. 
The next issue would be to identify the indicators of the charismatic effect in the 
group.  
The indicators of charismatic effect in a group include the presence of 
a strong communion effect and power structure. As highlighted in Chapter II, the 
thesis uses Bradley’s theory to analyze the charismatic effect in a group, and 
states that at a relational level, charisma means the generation of a state of 
communion in which individuals are bonded by highly charged, interlocking 
relations of positive effect. But, the communion cannot be attained without 
complete unity among group members. Consequently, close, intimate 
relationships between pairs or among cliques are seen as undesirable; the 
charismatic group will take action to prevent or closely control such bonds, which 
leads to the emergence of the power of the charismatic rule.89 Bradley says, 
“Communion and collective power are most closely linked to charismatic beliefs; 
they are not explained by any other collective or individual factors.”90 Elements 
that indicate the effect of communion are, one, extreme cohesion; two, presence 
of love and affection; and, three, a sense of optimism and euphoria.91  
1. Communion 
The first factor that contributes to communion is the presence of strong 
“cohesion,” indicated by the members surrendering all that belongs to them to the 
group. Collective commitment denotes cohesion, which Coser has described as 
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the state in a group when members replace their personal identity with 
unquestioning loyalty and commitment to the collective.92 Scholars call this state 
the de-individuation of the members.93 Kanter further says that ego loss and ego 
merging leads to de-individuation.94 Bradley describes ego loss as the process 
by which an individual renounces all his previous economic and social 
independence and pledges personal and material commitment to the group.95 
The second indicator of communion is the presence of a “sense of love and 
affection,” which normally translates to the formation of brotherhood groups 
based on social and religious ties. The group would indulge in rites and rituals 
such as congregations, collective prayers, and collective oath-taking to develop 
love and affection in the group. The third indicator of communion is the presence 
of a strong feeling of “optimism and euphoria” about the future, which follows 
from the belief in the efficacy of a charismatic leadership as the means to 
achieve the desired utopia. However, the euphoria varies with the presence or 
absence of the charismatic person in the group.96 To overcome the loss of 
personal contact with the followers, the current charismatic personalities make 
use of modern means of communications to replace their physical absence by 
virtual presence.97 
2. Power Structure 
The existence of a strong power structure between the leader and his 
followers is the second indicator of charismatic effect in a radical group. The 
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presence of a strong and centralized hierarchical organizational structure and an 
organized means of economic activity in the group indicate the presence of a 
strong power structure in a group.98 Rules, regulations, and their enforcement, 
socialization process, workflow, punishments, and rewards would indicate the 
presence of an effective power structure.99  
The mere presence of communion and power would not lead to a group 
becoming charismatic. Since the study is using Bradley’s theory of charisma to 
identify and measure charisma in a group, the two relational orders of 
communion and power structure must satisfy certain conditions for a charismatic 
effect to take place. Bradley’s theory states that a greater degree of consensus 
over the relationship of positive effect (communion) and power structure needs to 
be present in a charismatic group.100 This implies that until a minimum threshold 
is reached for the values of the two relational orders (communion and power), 
charisma will not emerge and sustain itself in a group. This in turn leads to the 
next issue: What is the right balance to sustain the charismatic effect in the 
group?  
C. CHARISMATIC STABILITY  
Sustaining a charismatic effect requires that it be stable, which means that 
it is survivable over time. Pribram and Bradley have empirically developed a 
theory of charismatic stability (measured in terms of its survivability over time) 
using the two relational orders of charisma in a group, communion and power. 
Using the existing data from a study of forty-six social collectives, they 
established that the interaction between flux and control is a strong predictor of 
stability, while measures of the collective’s normative and structural organizations 
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and of the members’ social characteristics have no predictive power. 101 They 
replaced the term “communion” and “power” with “flux” and “control” respectively. 
Hereafter, this study refers to the two relational orders of charisma as “flux” and 
“control.”  
The Bradley-Pribam theory states that interactions between the two 
relational orders (flux and control) affects stability by gathering and 
communicating information about internal organization throughout the collective. 
The scatter plot of flux and control, with respect to the forty-six communes shows 
that most communes scatter along the axis of the main diagonal of the field 
formed by “flux” and “control.”102 Survivability over time measured the stability of 
the groups. The hollow dots represent unstable or dissolved groups. See Figure 
6.   
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Figure 6.   Scatter Plot of Communes on Flux (Affective Attachment) and 
Control (Power) at Time 1, by Stability (Survival Status) 24 Months 
Later 
The region in Figure 7 depicted by grey and black shades along the 
diagonal represents the combination of flux and control that produced stable 
organizations. The base of this zone comprises routine organizations with 
minimum charismatic effect and at the upper end of the grey zone comprises 
maximally efficient, dynamic, adaptable, stable, novel, innovative, and highly 
charismatic organizations. At the extreme end of the diagonal, marked in black 
and separated by a region marked as turbulent, are the groups that contain 
maximum flux and maximum control. Such groups are transformational if they 
survive or else they implode due to “turbulence” caused by the high socio- 
psychological energy produced due to extremely high levels of “flux.”103.  
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D. STRATEGIES TO REDUCE CHARISMATIC EFFECT FOR MINIMIZING 
TERRORIST VIOLENCE 
1. The Concept and Strategies    
 The Bradley-Pribam theory of charismatic stability describes various 
combinations of “flux” and “control,” which may result in a group becoming 
dysfunctional. Figure 8 depicts these combinations. The first type of dysfunctional 
combination is termed “insufficiency” and comprises groups with very low values 
of flux and control. The second dysfunctional combination is named “ossification,” 
and comprises groups with a very high value of control but a low value of flux. 
The third dysfunctional combination is known as “volatility” and comprises groups 
with a very high value of “flux” but low value of “control.” 104  
                  
      
Figure 7.   Relationship between Flux and Control and Action States of 
Collective Organization 
Since we are interested in charisma-induced terrorist groups that would be 
in existence for some time, we can safely assume that they would be 
charismatically stable; hence their prevailing values of flux and control would 
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either be in the grey or black zones. See Figure 7. We had earlier concluded that 
if we reduce the charismatic effect of terrorist groups, then we can minimize the 
violence caused by them, which from the above model implies rendering their 
charismatic effect dysfunctional. Hence, the idea is to intervene in terrorist 
groups to change the existing levels of flux and control in order to reduce the 
power of charisma.  Bradley’s model suggests some possibilities for 
interventions.  For example, one strategy could be to push a group towards the 
“ossification dysfunctional zone.”  Alternatively, other strategies would be to force 
a group to move towards volatility, insufficiency, or turbulence dysfunctional 
zones. For ease of reference, the study terms these strategies as “ossification 
strategy,” “volatility strategy,” “insufficiency strategy,” and “turbulence strategy.” 
The following sections discuss the process and implementation of the proposed 
strategies. 
2. The Process of Rendering Charisma Dysfunctional   
The study suggests a three-step process to render the charismatic effect 
in a radical group dysfunctional. The first step is to identify the existing level of 
flux and “control” in the group. The second step is to identify the nearest 
dysfunctional zone in comparison to the prevailing values of flux and control. The 
third step is to identify ways to effect the desired variations in the level of flux and 
control, to reduce the charismatic effect or render it dysfunctional. Figure 8 
schematically represents this process.   
        
Figure 8.   Process to Render Charismatic Stability Dysfunctional 
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E. OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE “STRATEGIES”  
1. Assessment of the Existing Level of Flux and Control 
The first step in the implementation process is to identify the existing level 
of flux and control in the terrorist group. Since terrorist groups would always be in 
conflict with the state, assessing their values of flux and control objectively and 
quantitatively would not be feasible. However, we can identify the approximate 
values by qualitatively assessing the degree of “flux” and “control” through the 
indicators discussed earlier. For the purpose of this study, indicators such as 
instances of unquestioning loyalty, commitment to perform tasks for the 
collective, even at grave personal cost, quantity of dissensions, internal rifts, level 
of consensus, and the rhetoric of leaders and followers would form the basis for 
assessing the existing flux level in a group. Assessments would remain 
subjective and be categorized as low, medium, or high.   
Similarly, the study would assess the level of control based on the nature 
of the organizational structure (developed or undeveloped; hierarchical or flat; 
centralized or decentralized), delegation or non-delegation of authority, degree of 
economic controls to exercise power, and the system of reward and punishment 
prevailing in the group. Speeches and the public statements of leaders and 
followers related to exercising control would also help in assessing the level of 
control. Like flux, the assessment of control would also remain subjective and be 
categorized as low, medium, or high.   
2. Identification of the Right Dysfunctional Zone  
Once we have identified the existing level of flux and control in a group, 
then we need to compare the level of flux and control pattern closest to a 
dysfunctional zone and attempt to vary the values in that zone. For example, if 
we identify that pattern of flux and control in a terrorist group such as Hamas as 
“low flux and high control,” then we compare these values with the flux-control 
pattern of various dysfunctional zones. The pattern quoted in the example 
matches the flux pattern of the ossification zone (low flux, high control). 
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Therefore, we should attempt to further reduce the flux and increase the control 
to force the group into the ossification zone. Based on this methodology, Table 1 
contains the possible pattern of “flux and control” that we may encounter in 
terrorist groups and the corresponding dysfunctional zone to identify the right 
strategy to reduce or render its charismatic effect dysfunctional. Groups with 
medium and high values of flux and control mentioned at serial 4 and 5 would 
pose a slight decision dilemma in selection of a strategy. However, we can 
overcome this by selecting between any one of the available options based on 
the associated risk factors in adopting a strategy. For example, attempting to 
implode a group through turbulence has the maximum risk since the group may 
become transformational instead of imploding. This may occur because as the 
level of flux and control keeps increasing, a group becomes more and more 
stable, maximally efficient, and gives rise to a highly dynamic and adaptable 
organization. As we are aware from Bradley’s charismatic stability theory, after a 
certain level, flux and control stability is problematic as it requires an equally high 
amount of control. However, should the level of control witness an almost one-to-
one relationship between flux and control, then such an arousal may cause a 
sudden collective spasm making the transformation, reorganized and 
qualitatively different.105 Therefore, increasing or enhancing flux and control to 
force a group into the three dysfunctional zones (turbulence, volatility, and 
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Table 1.   Conditions for Application of a Particular Strategy to Reduce 
Charisma 
No Level of existing Flux and 
Control 
Strategy to Render Group Dysfunctional  
1 Low flux and  low control Insufficiency strategy i.e., further reduce the 
level of “flux and control” in the group. 
2 Low / medium flux but high 
control 
Ossification strategy, i.e., endeavor to further 
reduce flux and simultaneously increase 
power. 
3 Low / medium control but high 
flux 
Volatility strategy, i.e., endeavor to further 
reduce power and simultaneously increase 
flux. 
4 Medium flux and medium 
control 
Any of the three i.e., insufficiency, ossification, 
or volatility strategies may be adopted. In 
turbulence strategy, both power and flux would 
have to be increased. However, while 
attempting to do so, there is an equal chance 
of the group moving into the transformational 
zone Therefore, to avoid risk we should avoid  
the turbulence strategy.  
5 
 
High flux and high control 
         
We may adopt either the ossification or 
volatility strategies. It is not advisable to adopt 
the turbulence strategy because by increasing 
both flux and control chances of further 
making the group charismatic and virulent 
would be very high. 
 
3. Means to Vary Flux and Control  
The key to reducing or minimizing the charismatic effect in a terrorist 
group revolves around our ability to vary the group’s level of flux and control. The 
best way to vary the level of flux and control is from within the group, but that 
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would be an unrealistic and extremely risky method. However, it is feasible to 
change the flux and control levels of a group externally through some military and 
non-military means.  
a. Varying the Flux 
The first method to vary the flux could be by manipulating the 
cohesion level of the charismatic radical group. As discussed earlier, ego loss 
and ego merging lead to cohesion. Normally, social groups achieve ego loss and 
ego merging through the process of oath-taking in the name of the leader or the 
group, collective rituals, practices, ceremonies, and training activities.106 
Charismatic terrorist groups also resort to similar processes. For example, 
“Shining Path”107 and “PKK”108 have reported practices of oath-taking, 
indoctrination, and collective training. To carry out such practices, the groups 
require space and resources. Therefore, if we intend to increase or decrease the 
cohesion, we could deny or clandestinely provide the resources required to 
conduct such activities.   Practically, this amounts to varying the degree of 
freedom of terrorist groups to operate in their safe havens.   
A second method to vary flux could be to either isolate or bring 
together the leader and the followers of the movement through information 
operations or direct operations. Isolation of Öcalan, the charismatic leader of the 
PKK terrorist movement by the Turkish security forces and Guzman, the 
charismatic leader of the Shining Path terrorist movement by the Peruvian 
security forces, led to reduced communion with their respective followers in their 
movements. As a result, both groups lost the flux very rapidly and are now mere 
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caricatures of their original form. Paul White says, “Abdullah Öcalan’s capture 
posed a tricky problem for the PKK Central Committee for deciding his 
successor. 
However, subsequent leadership of PKK could not recreate the 
magic of Öcalan. Its current strength has declined from over 90,000 under 
Öcalan to just around 6000.”109 Similarly, after the capture of Guzman, the 
Shining Path rapidly declined and  became almost extinct.110 Besides direct 
operations to separate the leader from the followers, use of information 
operations could also be used; the themes could focus on projecting stories 
either enhancing or reducing the cohesion of a group based on the requirement 
of the strategy selected.  
A third method to vary the flux could be by tampering the sense of 
brotherhood and affection through a media campaign by spreading a myth of 
solidarity amongst the members of the terror movement and thereby revving 
them up to generate flux. Likewise, intelligently spreading stories of rifts and 
conflicts amongst the leaders and members may lead to reduced flux in the 
group. My suggestion is that the security forces could clandestinely generate 
such messages to vary the flux in a movement. Many leaders of radical 
movements have adopted such an approach. For example, Amir Taheri says that 
during the Iranian revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, while in exile praised the 
emerging leaders like Rafsanjani and Barghani including secular leaders and 
their ability to manage the revolution against the Shah, which led to masses 
cohering together and rising against the Shah.111  
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A fourth method to vary the flux could be by tampering with the 
Social Bonds of a terrorist movement. Sageman has said that 83 percent of the 
individuals who joined the jihad joined through some sort of social tie with the 
core group.112 It is a known fact that pre-existing family and friendly ties enhance 
the sense of love and brotherhood. Therefore, disrupting the social network of 
the terrorists by targeting the hubs would prevent communion and reduce the 
flux. Similarly, by relaxing the disruption operations directed against the social 
network, we could further strengthen the social ties amongst the group and 
increase flux.  
A fifth, and probably the safest way to vary the flux, would be by 
tampering the leader’s abilities to deliver the solution, which can be achieved by 
either enhancing or reducing the perception of his divine powers or supernatural 
abilities. One method to achieve this would be through a well-planned information 
operation campaign to either de-legitimize or enhance the image of the 
charismatic leader. Clandestinely either releasing fake stories of his 
achievements to increase his charismatic effect or de-legitimizing him to reduce 
the charismatic effect is a specific example of this approach. While there may not 
be many examples of security forces resorting to this technique, Mao used the 
print and audio media very effectively during the Chinese Cultural Revolution to 
enhance the flux in the revolution.113  Similarly, Guzman mystified his image 
using the student and university networks by spreading rumors and myths about 
himself to increase the flux in the Shining Path movement.114 On the other hand, 
the security forces in Peru were also able to delegitimize by shattering the 
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demigod image of Guzman and thereby reduce the flux, which led to the rapid 
decline of the Shining Path movement. The “Times” report on Guzman makes 
this point abundantly clear, “The first pictures of the captive Abimael Guzman 
were startling: an obese, bespectacled man obeying police orders to put on his 
shirt. Could this dumpy, bewildered fellow, last seen publicly in 1979, really be 
Shining Path's shining light?”115  
Finally, we may be able to change the flux level by tampering with 
the ideology of the group. The charismatic leader more often than not offers a 
customized ideology. For example, Guzman offered a compelling prognostic 
framework, to the majority Peruvian population, of solutions to the ills of Peru 
through the communist ideology fused in the promise of resurrecting the old glory 
of the Incan Civilization.116 Similarly, Osama bin Laden has customized Salafism 
by changing its focus from the near enemy to the far enemy.117 Ideology has a 
binding effect on a group; thus, it increases the communion effect. If we want to 
reduce the flux, we could delegitimize the ideology through information 
operations, and if we want to increase the flux, we could promote the ideology. 
However, if we want to achieve a lasting reduction in flux then we could go in for 
the long-term solution of changing their ideology. Brafman et al., suggest some 
simple but effective techniques. Brafman and Beckstorm give examples from the 
real world such as starting a small bank for the poor in Kenya, which prevents 
many youths from the slums of Kenya from taking up the ideology of Al Qaeda. 
Similarly, they (Brafman et al.) give another example of a social entrepreneur 
whose efforts in community rebuilding in the town of Bamian in Afghanistan, after 
the vandalism of statues of Buddha by the Taliban, is gradually changing the 
ideology of the youth.118 Bornstein also gives examples of silent but determined 
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social entrepreneurs who are taking up ideological issues to change the society 
despite heavy odds.119 Efforts of this nature would lead to a lasting reduction in 
flux.  
b. Varying the Control 
Direct actions to weaken or strengthen the organizational structure 
of a group could be the first method to change the level of control in a group. 
Mintzberg says that an organization regulates its functions through an 
organizational structure (hierarchy, leaders, managers, workers, and 
departments), resource management, man management, workflow, rules, and 
regulations.120 These elements ultimately help control the functioning of an 
organization or a social collective; thus, if we somehow manage to control the 
ability of a terrorist group to exercise the above functions, disrupting their 
organizational structure, management system, and resource control systems we 
would be able to degrade the ability of the group to exercise control. Similarly, if 
we relax our operations, we can increase the level of control in the group.    
Indirectly empowering or disempowering a terrorist leader could be 
the second method to increase or decrease the level of control in a group. The 
study is referring to the cow approach suggested by Brafman and Beckstorm. He 
says that when the Apaches were proving difficult to contain, the Americans gave 
them cattle. Once the Nant’ans had possession of a resource ─ cows ─ their 
power shifted from symbolic to material.121 Radical groups thrive on power 
through symbolism, especially if led by charismatic personalities. Similarly, the 
Government of India resorted to an approach of this type. Mr. Laldenga, a highly 
charismatic leader of the Mizoram National Front, a dreaded guerilla group, when 
                                            
119 David Bornstein, How to Change the World:  Social Entrepreneurs and the Power of New 
Ideas (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
120 Mintzberg, Structure in 5's: A Synthesis of the Research on Organization Design, 
summarized; D. S. Pugh, D. J. Hickson and C. R. Hinings, "An Empirical Taxonomy of Structures 
of Work Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly 14, no. 1 (March, 1969), 117, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2391367. 
121 Brafman and Beckstrom, The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of 
Leaderless Organizations, 151–154. 
 48
offered the opportunity to be the chief minister (metaphorically the cow) of the 
state of Mizoram, reduced his power level in the group. Consequently, he lost 
control in the group and as a result, his charisma faded.122 The group since then 
has lost its capacity to carry out violence. Similarly, exercising restrictions on the 
fund flow or clandestinely providing funds to alternate power centers would 
reduce the power and consequently the control of the charismatic leader.  
The difference between the traditional and the suggested anti-
terrorism approach is that in the traditional approach, we only focus on degrading 
terrorism, whereas in the anti-charisma approach, we have to focus on both 
degradation and enhancement of the two relational orders, “flux and control.” By 
doing so, we expect to render charisma either dysfunctional or reduce its effect 
so that the level of violence is reduced. The next chapter, focuses on studying 
the presence of charisma in Al Qaeda, and if charisma is present, then exploring 
the possibility of reducing its disruptive capabilities by reducing its charismatic 






                                            
122 South Asia Terrorism Portal, "The Timeline Mizoram Insurgency 1967–1986," 
http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/mizoram/timeline/1966_86.htm (accessed January 
14, 2009). 
 49
IV. AL QAEDA THE CHARMING HEADED HYDRA 
Osama bin Laden is the prophet of fundamentalist movements in 
Saudi Arabia. And Osama bin Laden is much more interesting than 
most of them because Osama belongs to a family that is part of the 
ruling establishment and therefore it [bin Laden’s popularity] is an 
indication of how bad things have got in Saudi Arabia. 
Sa’id Aburish, Palestinian Journalist 
 
No other terrorist organization in the history of terrorism has ever been 
able to create an effect in a single incident similar to 9/11 in which over 3,000 
lives were lost. Al Qaeda is a unique organization designed to beat traditional 
anti-terrorism efforts and has cleverly avoided the trappings of seeking political 
power or territorial control. Avoiding territory and focusing on goals that extend to 
people across national boundaries makes it a global terrorist organization, with 
global alliances, and helps it survive. Its members see in their leader the unique 
capability to oppose the only super power, an entity many in the Islamic world 
view as a major source of the problems that the Islamic world is facing. For a 
large cross-section of the Muslim population, this attribute of Osama bin Laden 
makes him a hero. Scheuer says, “We've moved from Bin Laden and al-Qaeda 
being a man in an organization to a position where it is now a movement or a 
philosophy, and he is a heroic leadership symbol. For better or worse, Bin Laden 
is the only credible Islamic leader of international stature. Nobody wears an "I 
Love Mubarak" T-shirt or a "We Love the Al Sauds." He has filled the leadership 
vacuum very nicely.”123  
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The capability to launch strategic violence on the most powerful nation in 
the world, heroic and visionary leadership, unique operating style, and 
customized ideology suggest a charismatic effect in Al Qaeda. This leads to the 
question, is there the presence of charismatic effect in Al Qaeda? And if it is 
present, then what is the current state of its charismatic effect (i.e., the level of 
flux and control)? This leads to the final question, what is the best strategy to 
render the charisma of Al Qaeda dysfunctional or reduce the charismatic effect 
so that we can reduce its (Al Qaeda’s) disruptive power to cause violence? In this 
chapter, the study answers these questions by first providing an overview of Al 
Qaeda. Second, it analyzes the presence or absence of charisma in Al Qaeda. In 
particular, it identifies the presence or absence of preconditions that facilitate the 
emergence of charisma and indicators of charisma in the context of Al Qaeda. 
Finally, in the event of charismatic indicators (i.e., the two relational orders, flux 
and control) being present in Al Qaeda, the study attempts to establish their 
present levels to identify the best strategy to render its charisma dysfunctional or 
reduce the charismatic effect. The aim of doing so is to reduce the violence-
causing capability of Al Qaeda.    
A. AL QAEDA, AN OVERVIEW 
AL QAEDA is an international terrorist network that was founded by 
Osama bin Laden in 1988. It is the offshoot of an erstwhile terrorist organization, 
Maktab al Khidmat lil Mujahidin al-Arab (MAK) or the Afghan Service Bureau led 
by Sheikh Abdullah Azzam. The primary role of MAK during the Afghanistan war 
with the Soviet Union was to provide financial and logistical support and recruit 
Arab fighters to participate in the jihad against the Soviet Union.124 After the 
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successful action against the Soviet Union, Osama wanted to change the 
mission of MAK from a regional organization into a global network of terrorists, 
which was contrary to the views of the then leader, Abdullah Azzam.125   Due to 
the differences in opinion on the future course of MAK, Osama left MAK along 
with Al Zawahiri, and formed a new group called the Islamic Army. However, due 
to the death of Azzam, the founding leader of MAK in a car bomb attack in 
Peshawar, Pakistan, Osama managed to merge MAK with the Islamic Army and 
rechristened the organization “al Qaeda” or “the Base.”126  
1. Goals and Objective 
AL QAEDA's goal is to establish a pan-Islamic Caliphate throughout the 
world by working with allied Islamic extremist groups to overthrow regimes it 
deems "non-Islamic" and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim 
countries.127 In February 1998, Osama bin Laden issued a statement under the 
banner of "The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders" 
saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens—civilian or military—and 
their allies anywhere in the world.128  
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2. AL QAEDA's Organization   
Al Qaeda has an organic structure with three distinct layers or divisions. 
Figure 9 depicts the conceptualization of its organizational structure. It maintains 
this organizational design primarily due to three factors. Firstly, the size of the 
organization precludes direct physical control by the charismatic. Secondly, the 
need to ensure security of the leadership and the core group from the threat of 
the global war on terror has forced the group to transform itself into a 
multilayered organization. The core group of the organization is comprised 





Figure 9.    Broad Organization of Al Qaeda 
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Al Qaeda has a well-organized economic activity to generate funds and 
other resources required to maintain a global terrorist organization. Bin Laden is 
a member of a billionaire family that owns the Bin Laden Group’s construction 
empire. He has invested his inheritance to generate funds to help the group. In 
addition, Al-Qaida maintains moneymaking front businesses, solicits donations 
from like-minded supporters, and illicitly siphons funds from donations to Muslim 
charitable organizations.130 Figure 9 depicts the broad organization of Al Qaeda, 
as it existed in 1998.131 This organizational structure has undergone 
considerable change in the wake of the U.S. attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq. For 
example, it has become more cyber-dependent having considerable presence on 
the internet, fighting ideologically rather than directly. However, both Cronin and 
Bergen argue that while it may have lost its original strength, it has emerged 
more resilient, robust, and cellularly structured. The organization still appears to 
be driven by its charismatic founder, Osama bin Laden, but with an even, more 
loose command and control structure, and a good leadership succession plan.132 
3. Strength 
It is impossible to know precisely the exact strength of the organization 
due to its decentralized structure. Al Qaida may have several thousand members 
and associates. The estimates range from 60,000 to 20,000.133 On the other 
hand, some believe that the core group is very closed and small in strength. For 
example, B. Raman, former additional secretary in the Government of India, 
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responsible for security and intelligence, has estimated that in order to keep the 
security of its cadre failsafe, Al Qaeda has kept its core group strength just over 
500 personnel and mostly coming from the Arab world. However, they have an 
extremely vibrant and strong social and material support network.134 Even 
Byman confirms this view that close supporters of Osama may be just a few 
hundred.135 Given the intensity of current U.S. operations, Al Qaeda’s core group 
might have a smaller profile. The organizational structure suggests that the 
center of gravity (CG) of the movement is the core group. Thus,  by impairing the 
core group or reducing its ability to function effectively, the entire movement 
could be expected to become severely degraded, at least for a while. Hence, this 
study hereafter focuses on the core group because its continued relevance is 
viewed as the reason why others are indulging in transnational terrorism.   
4. Ideology 
David Rapport says that we are experiencing a fourth wave of terrorism 
known as religious terrorism, which is built on the belief that the world has 
decayed into a morass of greed and moral depravity.136 Similarly, Sageman says 
that the Islamic version of this revivalist ideology—so termed because it calls for 
a revival of what people believe the original community was like—is known as 
Salafism, from the Arabic word salaf, the ancient ones.137 However, he further 
goes on to clarify that Salafism is currently associated with global jihad 
conducted primarily by Al Qaeda against the far enemy—the U.S., UK, France, 
and the West. Michael Freeman also says that Al Qaeda is Islamic in its ideology 
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but Sunni, and not Shi’a, and more narrowly part of the Salafi community within 
Sunni Islam, which seeks to return to a purer, stricter, and more fundamentalist 
implementation of Quran and Hadith (Prophet’s words).138   Scheuer, too, agrees 
with this viewpoint.139 Osama, by changing the enemy within the pre-existing 
salafi ideology, has customized a unique solution against the perceived or real 
threat to the Islamic world from the West. A uniquely customized ideology is a 
common feature of many charismatic radical movements. He calls for jihad by 
every Muslim youth against the far enemy (U.S.) rather than the near enemy 
(national governments in the Islamic world) because salafi rule cannot be 
established as long as the U.S. continues to support the local corrupt Muslim 
governments in the region. In the view of Salafists, the local governments of the 
Islamic world have strayed from the path of the God under the influence of 
western culture and ideologies such as democracy.  
5. Strategy and Tactics 
At the strategic level, according to the former CIA Director, George J. 
Tenet, “Osama Bin Laden's organization and other terrorist groups are placing 
increased emphasis on developing surrogates to carry out attacks in an effort to 
avoid detection.140(Anonymous 2003; Global Security 2004; Gunaratna 2002; 
Bergen 2001) The Combating Terrorism Centre (CTC) Sentinel, January 2009 
issue states that from 2003 to 2007, the Al Qaeda aligned itself with groups in 
nineteen additional countries.141 The trend may have slowed down due the U.S. 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, but it seems to have regained its strength 
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and ability to pose a viable threat to the United States and other non-Muslim 
countries. In fact, Gunaratna, Bergen, and many others conclusively confirm the 
efforts of Laden to obtain and utilize biological, chemical and nuclear weapons to 
achieve their goals and objectives,142 and should this happen, Al Qaeda would 
become a truly global non-state actor with genuine strategic capabilities.  
The tactics of Al Qaeda include assassination, bombing, hijacking, 
kidnapping, and suicide attacks. In recent times, due to the increased pressure 
from the allies, Al Qaeda has turned to the excessive use of suicide bombings, 
especially by women, as it is lot easier to access high security zones by female 
operatives. The initial hesitation due to restrictions imposed in the Quran on the 
use of women fighters for jihad has given way to operational imperatives. 
6. Current State of Al Qaeda 
Many believe that the intensity of operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
has made Al Qaeda ineffective. However, this is far from the reality. For example, 
Peter Bergen says, “They mounted suicide attacks in London in July 2005, 
plotted to blow up a huge fertilizer bomb in the London area in 2004, carried out 
a suicide attack in Tel Aviv that killed four in 2003, attempted two separate 
suicide operations against U.S. airliners in 2001 and 2006, and participated in the 
kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl in Pakistan in 2002.143  Similarly, 
Fernando Reinares says that in Barcelona the Spanish security forces arrested 
twelve Pakistanis and two Indians during a counter-terrorist operation on January 
19, 2008. Spanish authorities accused the suspects of involvement in a plot to 
carry out multiple suicide bombings on the city’s public transportation system. 144 
Even the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, although carried out by Lashkar ei 
                                            
142 Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror, 93; Anonymous, Through our 
Enemies' Eyes: Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and the Future of America, 124–125. 
143 Peter L. Bergen, "Al Qaeda, the Organization: A Five-Year Forecast," The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 618, no. 1 (2008), 20 (accessed February 5, 
2009). 
144 Reinares Fernando, "A Case Study of the January 2008 Suicide Bomb Plot in Barcelona," 
http://ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ (accessed February 8, 2009). 
 57
Toiba (LeT),  were motivated by and executed at the behest of Al Qaeda. A video 
tape received by the BBC of Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, believed to be Al Qaeda's 
military commander in Afghanistan and ranked number three in Al Qaeda, 
confirms this assessment. In the video, Mustafa has warned India of more 
Mumbai style attacks if India attacks Pakistan.145 The tactics of the attack and 
targets selected—a Jewish family, westerners, Mumbai, a symbol of capitalism, 
suggest direct or inspirational linkage to Al Qaeda.   
7. Centrality of Osama bin Laden 
How has Al Qaeda been transformed into such a potent force?  Is it 
because its star performer remains alive and free to act as he wishes somewhere 
in the Hindu Kush Mountains? What is so special about Osama bin Laden that he 
has withstood the onslaught of the world’s strongest armed forces? Since the 
prevailing worldview is that Al Qaeda is charismatic, the study hypothesizes that 
Al Qaeda has created a charismatic effect and this effect is primarily responsible 
for Al Qaeda’s robustness and resilience. It leads to the power of its core group, 
which facilitates the functioning of the various global cells and associate groups 
comprising the intermediate and outer core groups of the movement. If one were 
able to reduce the charisma of the core group, then the other layers of the 
organizations, such as the regional associates and outer core supporters, would 
revert to their original role of opposing the “near enemy.” The following section 
specifically examines the presence of charisma in the core group of Al Qaeda. 
B. PRESENCE OF CHARISMA IN AL QAEDA 
1. Preconditions for Emergence of Charisma 
The presence of a severe crisis in a socio-political setting is a sure recipe 
for the emergence of charisma in a group. People of the Middle East (ME), in 
particular, and most of the Islamic nations of the world, in general, consider that 
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their countries face an existential crisis due to the threat of the crusaders led by 
the U.S. and Israel on their culture and sovereignty. For example, Khalid Khalil 
Ahmed says, “The current generation of Muslims in the Arab world are the 
“young sons of that era with severe defeats— defeat of the Arabs in 1948, 1967, 
and 1973 on the hands of Israel.”146Even the countries that have remained pro 
U.S., such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, have severe internal tensions due to poor 
governance.  A large section of the Islamic world feels threatened because firstly, 
the Islamic world is attributing decadence in the Muslim society to the imposition 
of the Western culture.147 Secondly, radical Muslims blame the U,S., Israel, and 
other western nations for the misery of Muslims all over the world. For example, 
Laden states in his 1996 fatwa: 
It should not be hidden from you that the people of Islam had 
suffered from aggression, iniquity and injustice imposed on them by 
the Zionist-Crusaders alliance and their collaborators; to the extent 
that the Muslims blood became the cheapest and their wealth as 
loot in the hands of the enemies. Their blood was spilled in 
Palestine and Iraq. The horrifying pictures of the massacre in 
Lebanon are still fresh in our memory. Massacres that took place in 
Tajikistan, Burma, Kashmir, Assam, Philippines, Ogden, Somalia, 
Eretria, Chechnya, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, send shivers in the 
body, and shake the conscience. All of this and the world watch 
and hear, and not only didn't respond to these atrocities, but also 
with a clear conspiracy between the USA and its' allies and under 
the cover of the iniquitous United Nations, the dispossessed people 
were even prevented from obtaining arms to defend themselves.148 
[Sic]   
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Thirdly, the occupation of the Al Aqsa mosque by the Israelis, the 
occupation of the holy city of Mecca by the crusaders (U.S. troops), and the holy 
city in Iraq add to the humiliation of the Muslim world. The occupation of the two 
holy cities, Mecca and Medina, is considered a direct violation of the Prophet’s 
wishes that no foreign presence of non-believers be allowed in Mecca or Medina. 
Western presence in these two cities plays heavily into the religious psyche of 
the Muslims.149 Fourthly, the local governments in the region have failed to 
deliver on their promises and good governance.150 Fifthly, and probably most 
importantly, the occupation of the Palestinian lands by the Israelis undercuts all 
other crises in the region. The occupation of Iraq post 2003 by the U.S. has 
further aggravated the situation.151 To summarize, many people in the Arab 
world and other Muslim nations such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan, 
Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, and India perceive that their very existence is at stake 
due to the threat of the U.S., its allies, and other non- Muslim nations.152  
The presence of a leader with attributes such as divine powers to perform 
the impossible, or even miracles, is the most important precondition for a 
charismatic phenomenon to occur. In addition, charismatic personalities are 
visionary, master orators, persuasive, heroic, and prophetic in appearance. A 
literature review on Osama reveals that all these forms of superlatives and 
attributes are associated with him. Almost all the authors describe him as a 
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visionary in his field. Until he founded the Al Qaeda, jihad had focused only on 
the near enemy. However, Osama pointed the finger at the West for all the 
misfortunes of the Muslim world, and since then the far enemy (the U.S.) 
occupies the center stage for various Islamic terrorist groups, be they from the 
ME, Algeria, Europe, Afghanistan, or Indonesia.153 As far as his physical profile 
is concerned, almost all experts and scholars describe him as prophetic. In 
addition, Osama also makes a special endeavor to project a prophet-like image 
in all his public appearances, videos, and internet-based images.154 Some of his 
close associates describe him as extremely popular among his men, who love 
him deeply, because he is not domineering. He does not inspire terror in his 
followers. He participates with the young men in all their activities and lives 
mostly with his disciples.155 Bergen, who personally met him, described him as 
“A tall man, over six feet, his face dominated by an aquiline nose. Dressed in a 
turban, white robes, and a green camouflage jacket, he walked with a cane and 
seemed tired, less like a swaggering revolutionary than a Muslim ascetic.”156 
People also describe him as a gifted engineer who can create constructions that 
could resist the bombs of the Russians. Such tales provide the necessary divine 
origin to his abilities. In addition, most of his followers consider him extremely 
brave and capable of miraculously escaping death. Bergen, Roland, and the 
author of Through our Enemies’ Eyes, recount a number of such instances, 
including escaping certain death at the battle of Jaji in Afghanistan, surviving the 
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1998 U.S. missile attacks, poisoning attempts, and assassination attempts; these 
escapes make him mythical, legendary, a hero, and gifted with divine power in 
the eyes of his followers.157 In addition, the author of Through Our Enemy’s Eyes 
associates qualities such as piety, professionalism (Osama always seeks 
religious legitimization for his actions), patience, and being a slave of Allah rather 
than being considered a Prophet himself as some of the other characteristics of 
his personality.158 Thus, a personality surrounded by so many mythical stories, 
rumors and legends can very easily be viewed as charismatic to his followers 
and inspire the highest commitments from them. This may explain the 
occurrence of high intensity, socio-psychological, energy-driven incidents such 
as the 9/11 attacks, the suicide bombings of the USS Cole, the U.S. embassy 
attacks in Kenya, and bombings of public places in London.  
Presenting a unique solution by the leader to the perceived crisis of the 
social collective is the third pre-condition for emergence of charisma. Until the 
advent of Osama, radical thinkers such as Mawdudi, Hassan Al Banna, Qutub, 
and Azzam were offering an existing ideology, the purer and stricter form of Islam 
known as Salafism, as the solution to various problems and misfortunes of the 
Islamic world. 159  However, Osama customized a new ideology within the overall 
framework of Salafism by changing the locus of the problem from “non 
adherence to Islam” to the “actions of the far enemy.”160 This new orientation of 
an existing ideology has added yet another dimension to Osama’s personality of 
a man possessed of visionary thought and ideas, at least in the eyes of the 
radical Muslim population. Scheuer says, “For better or worse, Bin Laden is the  
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only credible Islamic leader of international stature. … He has filled the 
leadership vacuum very nicely.” 161 Bergen and Byman have echoed similar 
feelings.162  
2. Indicators of the Charismatic Effect in Al Qaeda 
As discussed in Chapter III, there are two indicators of presence of 
charisma in a terrorist/insurgent group or an organization. These are, firstly, the 
presence of flux, and secondly, the presence of control. Bradley operationalized 
flux with measurements of group cohesion, love (brotherly love), and a strong 
sense of optimism and euphoria.  Bradley operationalized control as a strong 
power structure between the leader and the followers.   In addition, the existence 
of rules, regulations and their enforcement, a socialization process, workflow, 
punishments, and rewards also indicate the presence of an effective control 
mechanism in a group. The following sections discuss Bradley’s two indicators of 
charisma in a group in greater detail. 
a. Presence of Flux 
The Al Qaeda has a multilayered organization, but the core group 
remains the most crucial for the existence and functioning of the other layers. We 
analyze the core group only for this study. The most important factor that creates 
flux in a group is cohesion. Cohesion in a group primarily occurs due to a strong 
bonding between the members of a group. This translates into the  unquestioning 
loyalty of each member to the group. It also amounts to surrendering all that 
belongs to an individual to the group and its cause. Many instances indicate a 
strong presence of cohesion in Al Qaeda. Dr al–Fagih (a surgeon who provided 
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services to the Afghan jihadis) says that of the fifteen thousand men who served 
with bin Laden in the war in Afghanistan, nearly four thousand are now 
committed to bin Laden by chain of command (inner core).”163 Similarly, while 
travelling through Afghanistan, when Bergen saw the barren and rocky terrain 
devoid of any cover where the Arabs (inner core of Al Qaeda) fought the Soviets, 
he commented, “The bravery of the Arabs who had fought under bin Laden’s 
command was lunatic, but impressive.”164 Such an act of bravado only comes 
from a very cohesive group. Similarly, the ease of inter group cooperation 
between associate groups of Al Qaeda such as the Lashkar-ei-Taiba and 
Chechen Terrorist groups is possible due only to the erstwhile bonds between 
the members of the two groups who had been part of the Al Qaeda’s core group 
during the Soviet jihad. The cooperation is further unique because it takes place 
even without the specific direction of its Emir, or Director, as people sometimes 
commonly address Laden. 165 These instances of unquestioning loyalty to Al 
Qaeda and to one another by the members of the core group clearly indicate 
strong cohesion.   
Al Qaeda’s leadership also pays special attention to the process of 
deindividuation through a process of religious, social, and political indoctrination 
military training, and the oath-taking of each individual. The de-individuation 
process starts with a religious ceremony called bayat, a quasi-medieval oath of 
allegiance to the emir or leader (note the emphasis on the leader and not Osama 
bin Laden).166 Even Scheuer says, “Career advancement in al-Qaeda tends to 
wash away much of the mercenary hypocrisy found at the entry level.” 
Commenting on the de-individuation process Gunaratna says, “The process of 
de-individuation in Al Qaeda is both moral and physical, which explains why a 
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high percentage of its attacks are suicide operations.167 However, a point to note 
is that many members are also paid, which does not disqualify the group from 
being charismatic because Bradley’s theory of charisma considers the existence 
of such activity in charismatic groups as normal for sustenance and survival.  
A strong sense of a “love” affect towards the leader and the group 
is the second factor that contributes to the creation of flux in a group. Bergen 
described this sense of love, affect, and brotherhood in Al Qaeda when he was 
interviewing Osama bin Laden at his hiding place somewhere in the Hindu Kush 
Mountains.  Bin Laden’s followers treated him with the utmost deference, 
referring to him with the honorific “sheikh,” a homage he seemed to take as his 
due. When Laden spoke, his followers listened in rapt attention as he went on to 
clarify that the presence of the U.S. armed forces in the Saudi Kingdom had led 
to the call for jihad.168 Gunaratna goes further and states categorically that, 
based on his research, Osama is viewed as fearless and unrelenting among his 
followers and admirers.  Neither he nor Al Queda will ever compromise.169 The 
orders of bin Laden were followed during the Afghanistan campaign as the word 
of God.  For example, the mere mention of an action by Osama led fighters like 
Atef and Abu Ubayadah to spur into action even without thinking about the likely 
cost and dangers involved in the action.   
Numerous other instances that strongly confirm the presence of 
love and affect are: 
 In a small and remote village of Yemen, a small boy carrying a 
Koran told Peter Bergen, “We love him. He fights for God’s sake 
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elsewhere including places such as London, where a keynote 
speaker in a conference lauded Osama as “the man who 
sacrificed his life for Islam.”170 
 Rolland describes the feelings of one of the followers of Osama 
as, “He not only gave his money, but he also gave himself. He 
came down from his palace to live with the Afghan peasants 
and the Arab fighters. He cooked with them, ate with them, dug 
trenches with them. This is bin Laden’s way.”171 
 Hamid Mir a journalist from Pakistan says, “The unidentified 
terrorists represented only a small percentage of those willing to 
defend bin Laden: he enjoys a cult-like status. I think he is more 
popular than any political leader in Pakistan.”172 
 Umer Farooq, leader of Lashkar e Taiba, says, “Mujahideen 
would sacrifice their lives to defend the hero of Islam.”173  
 The lure of Osama is so great that people volunteer to carry out 
high-risk tasks just to get an audience with Osama.  For  
example, a Hijbul member Md Iqhlaque went to India to carry 
out reconnaissance of Indian cities on the promise that he would 
be given a personal audience with Osama.174  
The presence of optimism and euphoria is the third indicator of flux 
in a group. It stems from a number of factors such as the perceived capability of 
the group members to deliver, previous instances of success achieved by the 
group, and the actual or perceived abilities of the leader to find a solution. As 
Weber noted, in charismatic groups, this also depends upon the ability of the 
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leader to perform miracles or at least actions that members perceive as miracles. 
Even Bradley says that optimism and euphoria are due to the catalytic effect of 
the leader in delivering the ends. Osama, as the Emir of Al Qaeda, creates a 
similar effect on the members of Al Qaeda. A sense of optimism has always 
prevailed throughout the lifespan of Al Qaeda. The following instances, events, 
and documents support the presence of euphoria and optimism in Al Qaeda: 
 Several witnesses of the battle of Jaji (1986) and Shaban (1987) 
recount that Osama was engaged in a bloody hand-to-hand 
combat against soldiers of the Red Army, and despite suffering 
an injury, won all the early battles against the communist 
defense forces. Until then, the Arab World had considered the 
Communist defense invincible.175 This ability of Osama to win 
against one of the best military troops instilled in his followers 
the optimism that he had the wherewithal to deal with any other 
military power of the world.   
 A number of Osama’s declarations contain the promise of 
solution to the problems of the Muslims. One such declaration 
reads, “We, my group, and I, have suffered from their injustices.  
… By the grace of Allah, we have a secure base in the high 
mountains of the Hindu Kush, where … the world’s largest army 
[Soviet Union] was destroyed. … From these same mountains, 
we are now working to put an end to the injustice that has been 
imposed on the Muslim community by the alliance of the 
crusaders and the Zionists. We ask Allah to grant us victory. He 
is our benefactor and the powerful one.”176 The message quite 
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clearly contains hope, optimism, and solutions to the problems 
of the Muslims through the defeat of the remaining super power, 
the USA.  
 On the issue of “optimism and euphoria,” Bergen says, “As a 
practical matter, the restoration of the Khalifa has about as 
much chance as the Holy Roman Empire suddenly reappearing 
in Europe, but as a rhetorical device. the call for its return 
exercises a powerful grip on bin Laden’s followers.177  
 Many scholars believe that Al Qaeda is now a redundant and 
spent force, but a more critical analysis would reveal that they 
have in fact become more resilient and robust. In a recent article 
(February 2008), Scheuer describes the current state of jihad 
from Osama’s perspective as, “By God's grace, al-Qaeda's 
incitement has met with wondrous success; Western polls show 
that hundreds of millions of Muslims now believe that U.S. 
foreign policy aims to undermine or destroy Islam. ... Thanks be 
to God, brothers, America is hemorrhaging money and ruining 
its military by trying to fight al-Qaeda's mujahidin wherever they 
appear — or, more accurately, wherever U.S. officials imagine 
they appear. Our military and media operations have advanced 
the ultimate goal of our grand strategy -- restoring Islamic rule to 
the Muslim world. We have a winning formula: Driving the 
United States from the Middle East; Destroying Israel and the 
region's Arab tyrannies; and settling scores with the heretical 
Shiites.”178 
These instances validate the presence of cohesion, a love affect, 
and optimism in Al Qaeda. The combined effect of these factors leads to the 
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creation of “flux” or socio-psychological, potential energy in a group. However, 
flux alone is incapable of creating a true charismatic effect in a group. The 
presence of control is necessary to create a charismatic effect.   
b. Presence of Control 
The presence of a strong power structure is mandatory in a group 
for the social control to be effective. Although in the initial stages, a leader 
exercises power through personal control, subsequently, an organized hierarchy, 
group of lieutenants, rules, regulations, and socialization processes become 
necessary to establish and exercise control. An examination of Al Qaeda’s core 
group reveals the presence of all these factors. Instances that indicate the 
presence of control in the group are: 
 Membership rules are very strict, for a person to be part of the 
core group; he must possess fourteen essential qualities. Some 
of these qualities include: knowledge of Islam, ideological 
commitment, maturity, self-sacrifice, the ability to maintain 
secrecy and conceal information, good health, patience, 
unflappability, intelligence, insight, caution, prudence, 
truthfulness, wisdom, the ability to observe and analyze, and the 
ability to act decisively.179   
 Each member has to undergo a strong induction program or 
socialization process,180 and finally, all are bound by the oath to 
the Emir General Osama bin Laden. 181  
 The performance of each individual is reprimanded or rewarded 
based on the success or failure achieved by the member. The 
rules and regimes are strict.182  
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 The presence of a well-defined formal organizational structure 
with a clear hierarchy, as described earlier in this chapter, exists 
in the inner core. See Figure 10.  
 Al Qaeda also has a strong mechanism of economic resource 
generation. It uses its economic power to exercise control over 
its members, components, and associate groups.183  
 The unquestioning nature of Al Qaeda followership is due to the 
presence of very strong control mechanisms, even over groups 
and cells not in direct contact with Osama. For example, 
Laden’s media information officer in Kenya had noted in his 
document on the computer, “We knew that the cell’s mission 
was to attack the Americans, but we the East Africa cell 
members, do not want to know about the operational plan since 
we are just implementers. In fact, many of his followers have not 
even met their hero. They simply follow orders.”184 There can be 
no higher degree of control present in an organization.  
While the above instances establish without doubt the hierarchical 
and strong presence of control in Al Qaeda, some reports of inadequate control 
also exist.  For example, some say that Al Qaeda manages to control its 
components due to its monetary power and not due to charisma. However, we 
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must not forget that post 9/11, Al Qaeda’s resources and monetary power have 
been severely degraded. Still, it manages to control its operations fairly well.185 
Thus, we can conclude from the above discussions that there is a 
large amount of flux and a considerable amount of control present in the inner 
core of Al Qaeda. The combined effect of the two relational orders, “flux and 
control” creates a charismatic effect as Bradley has empirically demonstrated. 
Therefore, it would be reasonable to assume that Al Qaeda does have the 
presence of charisma, especially in its core group. The process of creation is an 
output of a high amount of energy that provides the capacity for the group to 
perform seemingly difficult and spectacular tasks; control regulates that energy or 
aligns that energy to perform the task. One may equate flux to potential energy 
and control as the tool that converts the potential energy efficiently and 
effectively into kinetic energy or dynamic form. The implication of this theory is 
that outcomes such as the suicide bombing of USS Cole and 9/11 attacks are the 
end products of such effects. The following incident also illustrates, to some 
extent, the combined effect of flux and control, which we term  charismatic effect:  
Force of a fatwa depends upon who pronounces it, and none of the 
recognized Islamic authorities (Sunni or Shia) regards Osama bin 
Laden as a person capable legitimately of issuing one. Despite this 
fact, the motivation of Al Qaeda members to kill and their supreme 
indifference to death points to the fact that the forces that energize 
and propel the people of Al Qaeda to undertake spectacular tasks 
even at the supreme cost to their life, goes beyond the religious 
and ideological attraction.186 
In the above case, the flux is generated by Al Qaeda’s message 
and its leader’s personality, and the control is provided by the fatwa, which has 
the legitimacy of the personal power of Osama bin Laden. However, a relatively 
different result is seen in the intermediate and outer groups.  This is due firstly, to 
a lack of control, and secondly, to the absence of Osama from the intermediate 
and outer layers of the organization. This also confirms the results of Bradley’s 
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observations about reduced charismatic effect on absentee charismatic groups. 
Some instances confirming this observation are:  
 Al Qaeda is pragmatic while maintaining its association with 
groups that commit excessive and undesirable activities such as 
GIA in Algeria.187 They have not been able to exercise very 
effective control over associate groups. 
 Al Qaeda was also not able to exercise effective control over 
Zaraqawi the commander of AQ in Iraq. Reports suggest that Al 
Qaeda’s leadership was not in favor of starting anti Shia 
violence in Iraq and advised Zarqawi to refrain from it. However, 
the Al Qaeda (Iraqi) leader did not heed the advice. Osama 
grudgingly acceded to Zarqawi’s request to start a civil war 
because Osama himself was under grave threat, trapped in the 
FATA region of Pakistan.188  
The perception that the Islamic world is undergoing severe crisis, 
the presence of a leader perceived to possess divine powers, oath-taking in the 
name of the emir of Al Qaeda, an effective indoctrination process, organized 
economic activity to facilitate sustenance, and an effective power structure to 
control the group indicate that Al Qaeda definitely contains the charismatic 
phenomenon. This also explains the relatively high levels of violence perpetuated 
by Al Qaeda. Therefore, as suggested earlier, if we have to reduce the violence 
level, then we need to reduce its charismatic effect and, if possible, render it 
dysfunctional. This leads to the next issue of finding out the current level of flux 
and control in Al Qaeda so that we can identify the right strategy to reduce the 
charismatic effect or even render it dysfunctional.   
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C. PRESENT LEVEL OF “FLUX” AND “CONTROL” IN AL QAEDA 
As we discussed earlier, an appropriate strategy to reduce the charismatic 
effect can only be identified if we are able to establish the current levels of flux 
and control in a group or an organization. In order to identify the current levels of 
flux and control in Al Qaeda’s core group correctly and precisely, we would need 
to have access to the various members of Al Qaeda who could then be 
administered the sociometric questions developed by Bradley for his research 
with various groups in the U.S. However, such an approach is neither feasible 
nor suitable for terrorist groups, and since our aim is to counter their charismatic 
effect, it is unlikely that even if we somehow managed access to Al Qaeda 
members, for example, recent prisoners of Al Qaeda from Afghanistan or FATA, 
Pakistan, they would respond honestly to the questionnaires. To overcome these 
difficulties, the study suggests two strategies for measuring the level of flux and 
control in Al Qaeda. These strategies, although not the best option, would 
provide some amount of objectivity in assessment of the flux and control in Al 
Qaeda. These strategies are: 
 Strategy 1: The Delphi Technique. In the field of terrorism, we have 
a number of well established experts who are specifically either 
engaged in combating Al Qaeda or studying Al Qaeda. We could 
apply the Delphi technique to seek their estimates of the prevailing 
levels of flux and control. The experts could be senior military 
officers who are serving or have served in Afghanistan, serving or 
retired officers of the CIA and other intelligence agencies dealing 
with Al Qaeda, and academic scholars involved in studying Al 
Qaeda, such as Scheuer, Bergen, Roland, Byman, Hoffman, and 
Sagemen. As part of the Delphi process, we need to send a small 
write-up on the role of flux and control in the creation of charisma in 
a group. Having explained the attributes of flux and control, we 
need to ask for their assessment of the prevailing level of flux and 
control based on their experience of dealing with Al Qaeda. We can 
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then apply the Delphi process to arrive at a consensus value for the 
two variables essential for the creation of charisma. While this may 
not be the most accurate method to assess charisma, under the 
constraints of dealing with terrorist and insurgent groups it is 
probably the best technique.  
 Strategy 2: Quantitative Ratings.  Another alternative is 
quantitatively rating the views of scholars and experts on Al Qaeda 
by a panel of people involved in either combating Al Qaeda or 
studying about Al Qaeda in masters and PhD programs. We could 
also include some professors who are teaching terrorism and/or 
international security- related issues in South Asian, Central Asian 
regions, and the ME. As part of this strategy, we need to do a 
thorough search of the literature and the Internet to extract the 
assessments of various experts on Al Qaeda from journal articles 
and books. We need to take care to include only scholarly work and 
the assessments of renowned experts on Al Qaeda. These 
assessments convey the degree of presence of flux or control.  
Before proceeding further, it is highlighted that this is not the best 
method and suffers from certain shortcomings. These shortcomings 
include: firstly,, since the process depends on searching for and 
extracting the flux and control-related views of various experts and 
scholars on Al Qaeda, there would always remain a sense of 
incompleteness to all the views in the environment about Al Qaeda. 
Secondly, it would also depend upon the honesty of the researcher, 
as he may become selective in gathering assessments from the 
literature that conflict with his views. Finally, since it is an indirect 
assessment, the result would always remain suspect. However, we 
can minimize these shortcomings with an unbiased and exhaustive 
effort to search for expert opinions from all available  sources and  
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by drawing a realistic and a balanced panel of raters with authentic 
knowledge of Al Qaeda. In addition, the second strategy is easier 
and quicker to execute.  
For this study, Strategy 2 to was selected to identify and quantify the 
current level of flux and control in Al Qaeda. As part of the strategy, the opinion 
of experts on Al Qaeda was selected from the available literature on the Internet 
and in books. In order to maintain the currency of the ratings, the study 
considered views related to the presence of the level of flux and control in Al 
Qaeda from 2005 onwards only. Some of the scholars include: Michael Scheuer, 
author of Imperial Hubris; Gunaratna, author of Inside Al Qaeda;  Peter Bergen, 
the CNN expert on Al Qaeda and the author of Holy War Inc., a report published 
in Al Ahram journal of strategic studies Egypt; Abdul Hameed from Terrorism 
Monitor;  General Haq from the Pakistan Army; and Rich Lawry, author of An 
Islamist Backlash. For full details, see appendices A and B. To quantify these 
assessments and incidents, the study drew a panel of fifteen raters.  These 
raters were comprised of military officers attending the postgraduate program at 
the Naval Postgraduate School, from the defense forces of the U.S., Romania, 
Ukraine, Pakistan, Kenya, and the ME, including a former Indian Army Colonel, 
who was a former faculty member  in the department of National Security Affairs 
at the Naval Postgraduate School who was involved in combating Islamic 
terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. Panel members were advised to code firm 
attributions of the presence of flux or control in Al Qaeda by an expert as 1 and 
the absence of cohesion as –1, and any opinion or incident suggesting the 
intensity of flux or control in between these two extremes by values within this 
range such as + 0.5, +0.60 0.75, -0.5, -0.60, -0.75. The process of quantifying 
each opinion or incident quoted by various scholars was based purely on the 
perception formed by the rater after reading a particular assessment of a scholar 
contained in Appendix A and B prepared by me. Appendix A also contains the 
details of the calculation of the quantum of flux and control in Appendix B. The 
range of the current value of flux, by adopting this process, is 0.5979 +/- 0.0959, 
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(upper range 0.6938 and lower range 0.5020: one standard deviation) see 
Appendix A. Control is 0.6536 +/- 0.0758, (upper range 0.7294 and lower range 
0.5778: one standard deviation) see Appendix B. These values of flux and 
control, currently prevailing in Al Qaeda, place Al Qaeda somewhere in the 
centre of the charismatic stability model of Bradley. See Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10.   Prevailing Levels of Flux and Control in Al Qaeda 
Before proceeding any further, it is cautioned that although an honest 
effort was made to search for the available opinions of acknowledged experts on 
Al Qaeda from the Internet and other sources, the list is just a random sample 
limited by the time and resources that were available for the study. More 
exhaustive research would produce a more valid set of assessments and 
incidents indicating the quantum of flux and control present in Al Qaeda. Thus, 
the above findings should be viewed as rough approximations based on the 
opinions that were found on the Internet, both positive and negative. The sample 
statistics are not a 100 percent true representation of the opinion of the 
population on the present state of Al Qaeda.  
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The medium values of flux and control suggests that we can apply any of 
the three strategies evolved from Bradley’s model to disrupt charismatic stability 
and reduce the charisma in Al Qaeda. These strategies are, firstly, the volatility 
strategy (increase flux and reduce control); secondly, the ossification strategy 
(increasing control and reducing flux), and thirdly, the insufficiency strategy 
(reducing both flux and control). However, the safest strategy to nullify or reduce 
the charismatic effect of Al Qaeda would be through the “insufficiency strategy,” 
because the first two strategies would involve increasing either flux or control, a 
clever opponent could exploit it to move the group into generating a 
transformative charismatic effect, making the group even more destructive. 
Hence, a much safer approach would be to apply the insufficiency strategy to 
reduce both the flux and control. The next chapter specifically looks into 
implementing the “insufficiency strategy” with a view to reduce its charismatic 
effect and thereby reduce its capability to undertake violent acts. 
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V. STRATEGIES TO REDUCE THE VIOLENCE OF AL QAEDA 
Islamic governments have never and will never be established 
through peaceful solutions and cooperative councils. They are 
established as they [always] have been by pen and gun by word 
and bullet and by tongue and teeth.                                                                     
Al Qaeda Training Manual 
 
The transformational power of charisma provides an organization with the 
capacity to perform spectacular feats. A series of suicide attacks, bombing huge 
war-fighting ships such as the USS Cole by a small boat laden with explosives, 
and ramming jets into the World Trade Center are a few examples of this 
manifestation in Al Qaeda. As noted earlier, it is hypothesized that if we can 
reduce the charismatic effect, the capacity of a group to perpetuate violence 
should also be reduced. We argued earlier that endogenous interactions 
between two relational orders in a group, namely “flux” and “control,” creates the 
charismatic effect, which in turn affects the task performance of a group. We also 
saw that to identify an appropriate strategy to reduce the effect of charisma we 
need to assess the prevailing levels of flux and control present in a group as per 
Bradley’s model. In the previous chapter, we estimated that the core group of Al 
Qaeda currently has a medium level of flux (between 0.6746 – 0.4962) and 
control (between 0.7357 – 0.5730), based on which the safest strategy to reduce 
the charismatic effect would be to adopt the “insufficiency strategy.” This strategy 
involves reducing both the flux and control, to such levels that the group chokes 
due to lack of energy earlier provided by flux and the ability to control provided by 
its power structure and other control mechanisms. Therefore, the purpose of this 
chapter is to identify means to further reduce a) the level of flux and b) the level 
of control in Al Qaeda, thus bringing the organization into an insufficiency zone, 
as per the Bradley’s model. The means so identified could then form policy 
guidelines in dealing with core Al Qaeda and reducing the charismatic effect.  
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A. MEANS TO REDUCE THE FLUX IN AL QAEDA 
As indicated earlier in Chapter III, we can vary the flux in a group by 
manipulating the cohesion, the social network, the leader’s ability to deliver, and 
the ideology of the group. The means by which we can achieve these are: firstly, 
direct action, secondly, information operations, and thirdly, counter social 
movements propagating an alternate ideology. Figure 11 schematically depicts 
this approach. The strategies suggested below could target both flux and control. 
However, the specific theme implemented by the strategies would suggest 
whether they are meant for varying flux or control. For example, if direct action 
just focuses on restricting the operating space of Al Qaeda, it would be flux 
related; however, should the direct action focus on targeting the organizational 
structure or the financial resources it would be control related.  
 
 
Figure 11.   Strategies to Reduce the Flux in Al Qaeda 
1. Direct Action—Anti-cohesion 
Direct action implies denying safe havens for the group that facilitate its 
conduct of cohesion-building activities such as training, indoctrination, 
congregation, and other socialization processes. Simply put, keep the group on 
the run. The coalition forces are already undertaking such an action, which also 
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explains why the current flux level in Al Qaeda is relatively low. However, the 
continued availability of safe havens in Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) probably explains the current level of flux in the group. We need to 
continue our efforts to squeeze the operating space of Al Qaeda in FATA, even if 
it involves joint operations with Pakistan. This would help reduce the flux in the 
group. However, we need to avoid collateral damage in this process as it would 
enhance the flux, because causing collateral damage provides validity to the 
terrorist cause and thereby justifies the argument of its leader, which directly 
affects group cohesion. The group would cohere more in line with its leader’s 
wishes. 
2. Information Operations (IO):  Anti-cohesion Anti-leadership 
Anti-ideology 
A second means to reduce the flux would be through sustained 
information operations. The information operations (IO) need to target firstly, 
stories related to rifts in the Al Qaeda leadership; secondly, stories delegitimizing 
the leaders (Osama and Zawahiri) or stories creating a gulf between the leaders 
and the followers; and thirdly, anti-ideology. While all the security forces are 
undertaking such activities, they are not meeting with success because the 
methodology needs refinement. The IO campaign should appear to emerge from 
the Islamic world. Any amount of IO campaign from the West will only worsen the 
matter. As Crenshaw says, “US intentions will always be doubted and its 
activities are a lightning rod for terrorism.”189 For example, Maghraoui is 
recommending the creation of a “Muslim World Foundation,” funded through an 
act of the U.S. congress to target moderate Islam as a counter to the radical 
Islamic groups like Al Qaeda.190 The initiative is a wonderful suggestion, but care 
and caution are required so that the Muslims should not see the initiative as a 
                                            
189 Martha Crenshaw, “The “Terrorism Studies” Community and the UN Role in Counter-
terrorism,” Columbia University Press, 2002, 5, 
http://www.sipa.columbia.edu/cio/cio/projects/crenshaw.pdf (accessed on December 7, 2008). 
190  Abdeslam M. Maghraoui, “American Foreign Policy and Islamic Renewal,” Special Report, 
United States Institute for Peace, Washington, DC, July 2006, www.isip.org, 1. 
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Western agenda. However, the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) or NGOs 
from the region should only sponsor such initiatives; U.S. involvement could be 
tacit.  
The proposed NGO must focus on all aspects connected with terrorism, 
which delegitimize the story of AQ. It should highlight AQ’s nexus with drug 
trafficking, human smuggling, and money laundering. The method should, 
however, take the form of Itjehad (public debate) either online or during the face-
to-face meetings at the proposed World Muslim Foundation meetings. This way 
we would more effectively reduce the flux level in Al Qaeda. Some other ways to 
target the ideology of Al Qaeda to reduce the flux are: 
 Incorporating alternate but moderate Muslim voices in the IO 
campaign.  This would reduce the effect of Osama and Al Qaeda’s 
message. Esposito says that because acts of violence grab 
headlines, most of us know a lot more about advocates of a “clash,” 
militant jihadists, than about those who are working toward a 
peaceful revolution and civilized dialogue.  Esposito goes on to give 
examples of modern Muslim thinkers such as Abdurahman Wahid  
Indonesia, Dr. Amien Rais, a University of Chicago-trained political 
scientist and former leader of Indonesia, Anwar Ibrahim of 
Malyasia, Dr. Ecmettin Erbbakan of Turkey, and Muhammead 
Khatami of Iran who all went on to become presidents, prime 
ministers, speakers and leaders of moderate and modernist Islamic 
movements in their respective countries. 191 Personalities such as 
Drs. Tariq Ramdan, the grandson of Hassan al Banna (the founder 
of one of the most radical organizations in the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt), and Md Arkoun from Sweden, Abdulaziz Sachedin, Fathi 
Osman, and Sulayman Nyang, from the USA are a few examples of 
                                            
191 John L. Esposito, What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam, Oxford University Press, 
2002, 65. 
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increasingly moderate voices in the Muslim world. Incorporating 
such personalities as counter to Osama and Al Qaeda in the 
information campaigns would contribute to diverting the members 
of Al Qaeda towards moderate ideologies and thus reduce its flux 
effect. Similarly, Sagemen suggests that promoting Islamic heroes 
who promote and fight for peace must form part of the counter 
theme to win the battle for the hearts and minds. Worldwide media 
should give far more play to the prominent Muslim leaders. Muslims 
who reject violence should join the battle online and confront the 
terrorists sympathizers with horrors perpetuated in their name.192 
 Countering Salafi jihad by demilitarizing193 the conflict except 
for sanctuary denial and by reducing the terrorists to common 
criminals. Sagemen says this would take the glory out of Al Qaeda 
and Osama’s message of Salafism. Demilitarizing implies calling 
the current campaign against Al Qaeda not a war but a police 
action. He suggests motivating the Muslim world by the U.S. 
walking the walk and taking the moral high ground; the U.S. should 
always seem to favor the right cause.194 Incorporating such themes 
in the IO campaign would help lower the flux among the members 
of Al Qaeda as their ideology would lose the binding force and thus 
further lower the cohesion or the flux in the group.  
3. Social Entrepreneurship:  Creating an Alternate Ideology 
Ideology is an important component for producing flux in a group. While 
we can pick holes in the ideology of the group and the leader through an 
information campaign, and reduce the flux by making the members disillusioned 
                                            
192 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2008, 
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193 By demilitarization, Sageman implies converting the operations against AQ into a non-
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194 Ibid. 
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with the ideology of the leader, a more enduring solution would be to promote an 
alternate ideology through social entrepreneurship. This would divert the 
members of the group more comprehensively in a totally new direction and would 
result in an alternative flux. However, to start an alternate ideology requires 
dedicated social entrepreneurs who can wean away the support base of Al 
Qaeda. Brafman and Beckstorm give examples from the real world such as 
starting a small bank for the poor in Kenya, which prevents many youths from the 
slums of Kenya from joining Al Qaeda. Similarly, he gives another example of a 
social entrepreneur whose efforts in community rebuilding in the town of Bamian 
in Afghanistan, after the vandalism of statues of Buddha by the Taliban, is 
gradually changing the ideology of the youth and weaning them away from 
joining Al Qaeda or the Taliban.195 Bornstein also gives examples of silent but 
determined social entrepreneurs who are taking up ideological issues to change 
the society despite heavy odds.196  Based on this concept, the study suggests 
starting a counter Al Qaeda Network by connecting and coalescing social 
entrepreneurs who focus on civic action, reconstruction, and development with 
the purpose of weaning away the Al Qaeda support base from FATA and the 
border areas of Afghanistan. To achieve this, we need independent social and 
economic entrepreneurs born in the operating areas of Al Qaeda, rooted in the 
culture, but modern in outlook. There may be very few enterprising souls, but 
even networking the few who are there would have the potential to generate a 
collective flux that may encourage others to join the movement.  One may even 
have hope that the process starts a counter social movement; we will never find 
out if this might work unless we try.  
There is a strong likelihood of the above initiative succeeding because 
there are signs of a movement emerging in the Muslim world to promote 
moderate Islam. Maghraoui, in his report on American Foreign Policy and Islamic 
Renewal, argues that the problem of “religious extremism” in the Muslim world is 
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an ideological challenge best confronted by drawing on Islam’s humanist and 
progressive traditions. He refers to this process as “Islamic Renewal” and defines 
it as the systemic reconsideration and rationalization of Islamic doctrines, 
institutions, beliefs, and practices. Many individuals and institutions are involved 
today in this movement. Although they are not formally connected, their efforts 
coalesce around research centers, individual scholars, modernist religious 
figures, moderated religious organizations, political parties, and activist Web sites 
scattered throughout the Muslim world and the Muslim diaspora in the West.197 
He advocates encouraging the mobilization of this emerging moderate Muslim 
social movement by broadening the societal support for modernist Islam around 
a coherent vision and translating that vision into enduring pacts, viable 
institutions, and concrete policies. The initiative should include the collection of a 
database on Islamic modernist networks across the globe and networking them 
to meet online and face to face by organizing periodic regional and global level 
workshops held in predominantly Muslim countries and countries where Muslims 
constitute significant minorities.198 The initiative must leverage events such as 
the Fatwa, issued by over 5,000 Islamic clerics of the Deobandi sect, a militant 
Islamic ideology in India decrying terrorist acts and calling upon the Muslim 
populations to oppose terrorism.199 This event had its first positive impact when 
the Muslim Council of India refused to accept the bodies of the terrorists involved 
in the 26/11 Mumbai attacks because of their non-Godly act.200 These incidents 
clearly indicate the rise of moderate Muslims, even if it is currently a minority 
movement against terrorism.  
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Mobilizing such a network is a challenging task, especially in failing and 
developing nations like Afghanistan and Pakistan. In addition, the security 
environment further imposes constraints on such movements, more often stifling 
them even before they see the light of day. Who would risk operating in a terrorist 
infested country? It is for this reason that the study proposes a UN facilitated 
network of local social entrepreneurs along the lines of Bill Drayton’s Asoka 
Fellows organization.201  The purpose of the social movement would be to evolve 
a network of entrepreneurs within the region where Al Qaeda operates today. 
These social entrepreneurs should work on themes such as education, rural 
health, village level development, social harmony, reconstruction, development, 
and civic action. The proposed network should be self-organizing, scale free, with 
UN working as the hub and the entrepreneurs as the spokes to begin with; later, 
independent hubs may also emerge and should be encouraged. Disciplines such 
as health, child education, religion, agriculture development, and crime fighting 
should form sub-hubs as the movement grows. The network would do wonders if 
it emerges through citizen group initiative.202 To begin with, UN agencies could 
take on the establishment and management of the network. However, it needs to 
move into the private entrepreneurship domain as soon as the critical mass 
builds up to sustain the network on its own through self-organization and 
volunteers who believe in the development of Afghanistan and FATA. 
 
                                            
201 For more details, see Bornstein, How to Change the World:  Social Entrepreneurs and 
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Figure 12.   Ways to Reduce the Control 
B. MEANS TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF CONTROL IN AL QAEDA 
As discussed in Chapter III, we can reduce the level of control by 
disrupting the organizational structure of the group and directly or indirectly 
empowering the leader of the group. Figure 12 depicts the concept to reduce the 
level of control in Al Qaeda. In the following sections, we will discuss the viability 
of applying this concept with respect to  Al Qaeda’s core group.  
1. Direct Kinetic Action  
Kinetic action to disrupt the organizational structure of Al Qaeda is already 
in progress. However, what is lacking is the ability to identify and locate the 
elements of the organizational structure of Al Qaeda, which is primarily due to a 
lack of sound human intelligence. Without undermining the current effort, the fact 
that we have still not been able to locate the core organizational structure of Al 
Qaeda entails changing the approach to gathering intelligence. In order to 
overcome the current impasse on obtaining real time intelligence on locating the 
Al Qaeda leadership and its organizational structure, the study suggests the 
creation of intelligence resource control and war of ideas network. The details of 
the initiative follow: 
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 Intelligence networks have traditionally remained closed and 
bounded amongst the actors. The study proposes a more open-
ended intelligence sharing mechanism with civilian administrative 
agencies, local bodies, and willing local headmen incorporated in it. 
Currently, most of the agencies work independently and share 
information on an as needed basis. This is a discretionary process 
and depends upon the willingness and attitude of the intelligence 
providing agencies. The web platform-based networked 
organization would focus on the dual tasks of intelligence gathering, 
sharing, and problem solving. The intelligence gathering and 
sharing function may remain relatively closed with controlled 
access; however, the problem-solving network should be scale-free 
and open to all. The problem-solving network should focus on 
identifying solutions through public participation on issues related to 
combating radical ideologies, intelligence gathering techniques, 
civic action, and development. The working of the problem-solving 
network would resemble a Wikipedia type of network. Conceptually, 







Figure 13.   Intelligence Network Concept 
 The network would have two distinct divisions: internal and 
external. The internal security intelligence and resource control 
network would function with the direct support of the coalition forces 
in providing actionable intelligence for operations and resource 
control. Its primary function would be intelligence gathering and 
sharing the intelligence internally and with the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) elements deployed in Afghanistan. On the 
other hand, the external component would be open to the common 
public, like Wikipedia, with the function of generating ideas related 
to gathering intelligence, ideas for peace, reconstruction, and 
development. Although a networked organization, it would have a 
certain amount of hierarchy. The design would look like a mix of 
mesh and clusters.203 See Figure 14 below. The actors would be 
military intelligence units, coalition forces’ operational units, police 
intelligence units, NGOs, citizen groups, headmen, and the 
operational headquarters of ISAF at all levels. The network would 
have to organize itself to meet periodically at various levels and at 
                                            
203 Patti Anklam, Net Work, Butterworth – Heinemann, Burlington, USA, 2007, 54–57. 
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varying frequencies. The bottom up approach involving the jirga, 
tribal chiefs and village heads is likely to provide useful results.  
 
Figure 14.   Intelligence Network 
 Afghanistan and Pakistan Police (FATA) should provide the 
management staff for the network; coalition military intelligence 
units may provide the technological support until the indigenous 
structures achieve proficiency. Web-based meetings should form 
the backbone of intelligence sharing. Any agency/entity may post a 
problem related to an intelligence issue on the web platform 
seeking solutions from the net participants. With respect to usability 
and participation, since there will be local village headmen also 
incorporated in the net, I propose a local icon-based functioning of 
the net. Icon based functioning refers to using the net through 
symbols and duplicating it in local languages. As far as the 
participation of the civilian elements are concerned, jirga and tribal 
chiefs need encouragement, even negotiation to induce well-
meaning people from their communities to take part in the network.  
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 Possible outcomes of this form of network would be real time 
intelligence sharing and the tapping of realistic and genuine 
sources of intelligence. Finally, such a collaborative process would 
create secondary effects such as building trust with locals; it would 
help tremendously in resource control of materials such as arms, 
ammunition, funds, and poppy money. This may also prevent a 
diversion of resources to the terrorists. The net is also likely to 
emerge as an effective platform for waging the war of ideas through 
the locals and village headmen being present in the net. The 
challenges remain the same: willingness and motivation of civilians 
to join such a network and the security arrangements against 
possible infiltration by sympathizers of Al Qaeda and Taliban. 
It is felt that kinetic action backed by sound intelligence would effectively 
target the organizational structure, its means of communications, and specific 
sources of financing that provide the necessary means to the organization to 
exercise control over the group and its operations. Systematic degradation of 
means of control, but without causing collateral damage (as it causes flux to 
increase in terrorist groups by bonding them together), would effectively reduce 
the level of control in the organization. The low level of control in combination 
with a low level of flux would push the group into a charismatically insufficient 
zone. This in turn would reduce the capacity of Al Qaeda to cause violence. 
2. Disempowering the Leader and the Group  
As discussed in Chapter III, a leader often uses the economic resources at 
his command to exercise control in a group. Many scholars such as Gunaratna, 
Bergen, Scheuer, and Rolland also confirm that Osama bin Laden has used his 
ability to finance or bankroll terrorist operations as a means to exercise control in 
Al Qaeda.204 In fact, Rolland says that Osama also inherited the title of “the 
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financier of international Islamic terrorism.”205 Scheuer says that money is the 
key to the power of Osama bin Laden.206 Giraldo and Trinkunas state that prior 
to 9/11, the annual budget of Al Qaeda was approximately $30 million, however, 
due to the restrictions and countermeasures imposed by the U.S., the estimates 
of its spending have dropped to almost $3 million.207 This also explains the 
relative inability of Al Qaeda to exercise control over its cells and operatives. 
Osama, being a businessman, successful fundraiser, and international terrorism 
financier, finds himself acutely handicapped in the current scenario due to lack of 
access to money, which drastically affects the level of control in Al Qaeda. His 
desperation can be understood by the following fatwa issued by him to the 
various operators and cells of Al Qaeda, “Muslims could steal money from “the 
infidel” so long as 20 percent of criminal earnings went to the jihadists.” The 
inability of Osama to exercise control through non-availability of funds must 
continue so that the capability to exercise control further diminishes. While 
restricting the economic resources, we need to take care that we jointly target the 
Taliban and Al Qaeda since they enjoy a symbiotic relationship. Al Qaeda and 
Taliban generate their funds through Muslim charities, opium trafficking, and 
criminal activities. These sources need blocking by an integrated national and 
international effort. The problem, however, lies in achieving international 
cooperation between diverse internal and external agencies dealing with financial 
regulations, such as the banking structure, anti narcotics agencies, police, 
military, and customs of the U.S. and other countries involved in tracking and 
disrupting the fund flow to various terrorist organizations. Globalization of 
terrorism and the variety of ways in which money can be transferred, such as 
online banking, shady banking systems in certain countries, and the hawala 
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system (informal banking especially popular in South Asia and the ME) make it 
extremely difficult to follow the money trail leading to terror groups. A globally 
integrated effort co-opting the various agencies appears to be the only answer to 
the problem. However, the fact that the U.S. has been able to achieve some 
success in this area should offer hope of regulating the fund flow to Al Qaeda. If 
we are able to block the fund flow, we would effectively reduce the level of 
control in the group.  
3. Disempowering by Denying the Medium of Control   
Bergen said after the January 14, 2009 video of Osama after the Israeli 
attacks on Gaza,  
Sometimes he makes specific calls for attacks on particular places. 
For instance, he called for attacks on Spain, and there were attacks 
in Madrid in 2004. He called for a response to the Danish cartoons 
of the Prophet Mohammed, and there was an attack by al Qaeda 
on the Danish Embassy in Pakistan last year. And I can give you 
several other examples. That's the way he maintains operational 
control. 208 
So, if that is the way Al Qaeda exercises control, we should somehow 
restrict this ability of Osama and the senior leadership of Al Qaeda to 
communicate with its followers and cell members. This implies putting an iron 
curtain over the FATA/Afghanistan border areas, the Hindu Kush Mountains, and 
Chitral, the places where we believe that Osama may be hiding. The moral 
correctness of such a step should not come in the way of eliminating a disruptive 
force with the potential to cause mass casualties. Similarly, Osama and Zawahiri 
release periodic videos and audio cassettes. In order for these cassettes to reach 
Al Jazeera, they first need to be prepared and then transferred to Al Jazeera. A 
more focused approach to following the trail of video and audio clips could, a) 
lead to identifying the leader’s locations, and b) prevent its release, which would 
seriously hamper the release of  the operational message of the group to its 
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cadre that are now not in direct contact with its core group. This would definitely 
reduce the level of control and thus contribute to reduction of the charismatic 
effect in Al Qaeda. Establishing virtual presence by Osama not only provides him 
with the ability to control his followers but also inject flux by virtual contact as an 
alternative to physical contact (overcoming the absentee charismatic effect, see 
Chapter III). 
C. SYNTHESIS OF FLUX AND CONTROL  
We surmised that applying the insufficiency strategy in the currently 
prevailing flux—control milieu in Al Qaeda’s core would reduce the charismatic 
effect. The endogenous interaction within the group of these two relational orders 
creates the necessary charismatic effect and stability. The study recommends a 
simultaneous and integrated implementation of various measures to reduce the 
flux and control in the core group of Al Qaeda. The essential elements of the 
strategy are: 
 Use focused direct action to deny safe havens to prevent Al Qaeda 
from undertaking activities that promote cohesion, such as 
collective training and religious indoctrination. We need to continue 
our efforts to squeeze the operating space of Al Qaeda in FATA, 
even if it involves joint operations with Pakistan. This would help 
reduce the flux in the group. However, we must avoid collateral 
damage in this process as it enhances the flux. Similarly, we should 
take focused direct action to degrade the organizational structures 
and financial resources of Al Qaeda. For better direct action to 
disrupt the power and control structure of Al Qaeda, we need to 
establish an intelligence resource control and a war of ideas 
network. The purpose of the network would be to provide better 
actionable human intelligence. This would help avoid collateral 
damage besides providing ideas for an anti-ideological campaign. 
Similarly, for choking the diversified fund resources of Al Qaeda, as 
Osama is known to draw his power through funding, we need to 
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integrate all agencies that deal with national (Pakistan–Afghanistan 
based agencies) and international financing regulations, such as 
anti–narcotics, anti-money laundering, anti-criminal agencies. The 
simultaneous reduction of flux and control through direct action in a 
focused manner would lower the current values of flux and control. 
The new values would interact with each other resulting in lower 
charisma in Al Qaeda as per Bradley’s theory of charismatic 
stability. This would in turn result in less violence, as identified 
earlier in Chapter III. 
 Undertake sustained information operations focusing on stories 
related to rifts in the Al Qaeda leadership; de-legitimization of the 
leaders (Osama and Zawahiri) or creating a gulf between the 
leaders and the followers; and anti-ideology. Spreading stories of 
rift, internal conflict, demilitarizing the salafi jihad, and encouraging 
alternate but modern Islamic thinkers amongst the Islamic world 
should form the core of this campaign. The campaign should focus 
on anti-cohesion, anti- leadership (de-legitimization), and anti-
ideology themes.  
 We need to encourage social entrepreneurs who focus on bottom-
up social movements that promote alternate ideologies, social 
harmony, civic action, reconstruction, development, and micro-
financing. Bill Drayton, a social entrepreneur, runs a worldwide 
organization called Asoka fellows in the under-developed and 
developing countries of Latin America, South Asia (especially India 
and Bangladesh), and SE Asia; it has some presence in Pakistan 
and Afghanistan, too. We need to transform such movements into a 
revolutionary phenomenon only then we can create an alternate 
collective flux to counter the flux of Al Qaeda.   
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 Osama and the Al Qaeda senior leadership are attempting to 
overcome the lack of control over its cadre by exploiting virtual 
means such as the internet, satellite radio, and the release of video 
and audio cassettes from TV stations such as Al Jazeera. We need 
effective blocking of these channels of communications over areas 
where Osama and his core group are suspected to be holed up or 
hiding. Establishing virtual presence by Osama not only provides 
him with the ability to control his followers, but also inject flux by 
virtual contact as an alternative to physical contact (overcoming the 
absentee charismatic effect, see Chapter III).  
In the foregoing discussions, the study has made an effort to identify the 
structure of charisma in a radical movement. Since charisma-induced 
movements produce intense violence, reducing the charismatic effect would 
reduce the level of violence. I applied Bradley’s theory of charisma to analyze Al 
Qaeda because Bradley’s theory also provides the scope to manipulate the 
charismatic effect in a group. The study found that Al Qaeda has a significant 
presence of charisma, especially in its core group, and that applying the 










VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
No person in the world has earned as many superlatives to describe his 
personality as Osama bin Laden. The attribution of charismatic qualities to 
Osama by various scholars prompted me to analyze Al Qaeda and its emir 
Osama bin Laden, from the perspective of charismatic theory. The thesis first 
examined the relationship between charisma and radical social movements. It 
was able to establish through a study carried out by “cell” and other available 
evidence in literature on charisma-induced terrorist movements, such as the 
Shining Path, the Cultural Revolution, the PKK (Kurdish Rebels), Hezbollah, 
Hamas, Fatah, and PIRA that the presence of charisma makes a radical 
movement excessively violent and disruptive. This implies that we can reduce the 
level of violence by reducing the level of the charismatic effect in a group. 
Pursuing this deduction, the thesis used Bradley’s theory of charisma to study Al 
Qaeda.  
Bradley’s theory states that for the creation of charisma, a group 
interaction between two relational orders of the group, namely “flux” and “control” 
is essential. Flux represents collective energy produced due to cohesion, a sense 
of brotherhood, love, affection, euphoria, and optimism in the group. A strong 
hierarchical organizational structure, rules, regulations, and financial means 
create the capacity to exercise control in a group. These two relational factors 
endogenously react in a group to create a charisma. However, a certain 
minimum level of flux and control is also necessary. The study used the evidence 
available in literature to establish that Al Qaeda does contain a charismatic 
effect.  
Having established that Al Qaeda has a charismatic effect, the study 
applied Bradley’s theory of charismatic stability to identify strategies to reduce 
the charismatic effect in Al Qaeda, the aim being to reduce the violence 
perpetuated by Al Qaeda. Bradley’s theory of charismatic stability states that if 
there is an imbalance in the level of flux and control, the group loses its 
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charismatic effect and consequently the capacity to perform transformative and 
innovative tasks. Depending on the level of flux and control, there are four 
charismatically dysfunctional and unstable zones. Firstly, there is the zone of 
insufficiency in which the level of flux and control are extremely low. Secondly, 
the zone of volatility, in which the level of flux is extremely high, but the level of 
control is low. Thirdly, the zone of ossification in which the level of control is very 
high but the level of flux is very low. Fourthly, the turbulence zone, in which both 
the level of flux and control are very high and the group may either dissolve or 
become extremely transformational and innovative. Using these findings of 
Bradley’s, we can externally manipulate the level of flux and control in Al Qaeda 
and make it either charismatically unstable or reduce the level of charisma. The 
study then extracted opinions and incidents quoted by various experts on Al 
Qaeda such as Bergen, Sageman, Hoffman, Bukhari, Byman, to name a few that 
convey the intensity of the current level of flux and control in Al Qaeda. These 
incidents and opinions were then rated by an independent panel of military 
officers involved in combating Al Qaeda or combating terrorism in masters’ 
programs at the Naval Postgraduate School on a scale of –1 to +1. The study 
found that  Al Qaeda currently has a medium level of flux and control.209 The 
charismatically unstable zone closest to these values of flux and control is the 
“insufficiency zone.” To implement the insufficiency strategy, The study has 
recommended using all available means to reduce the flux and control so that its 
charismatic effect reduces, which would lead to a reduction of violence. 
Following are the salient elements of the recommended strategy:  Firstly, 
we need to undertake focused direct action to deny safe havens that prevent Al 
Qaeda from undertaking activities promoting cohesion such as collective training 
and religious indoctrination. For better direct action to disrupt the power and 
control structure of Al Qaeda, we also need to establish an intelligence resource 
control and a war of ideas network. This would help avoid collateral damage 
                                            
209 A word of caution is in order here.  This is not the best method to identify the current level 
of flux and control, but within the time constraints, this was a fairly satisfactory process to assess 
those values prevailing in Al Qaeda.  
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while taking direct action as well as providing ideas for an anti-ideological 
campaign. Similarly, since the availability of finance also provides the ability to 
exercise control in a group, choking the funding resources of Al Qaeda is 
essential. To achieve this, we need to integrate all agencies (regional and 
global), which oversee or regulate the sources that may provide an avenue to 
finance Al Qaeda, such as anti–narcotics, anti-money laundering, banking, and 
anti-criminal agencies. Secondly, undertake sustained information operations 
focusing on spreading stories related to rifts in Al Qaeda, de-legitimization of the 
leaders (Osama and Zawahiri), and anti-ideology. Thirdly, we need to encourage 
social entrepreneurs who focus on a bottoms-up social movement that promotes 
social harmony, civic action, reconstruction, development, and micro–financing. 
We need to start such counter social movements in the Islamic world promoting 
social harmony, moderate Islam, and development; only then we can create an 
alternate collective flux to counter the flux of Al Qaeda. And finally, we should 
effectively block the channels of communications over areas where Osama and 
his core group may be hiding. Establishing a virtual presence by Osama not only 
provides him with the ability to control his followers, but also injects flux by virtual 
contact as an alternative to physical contact. It is felt that these initiatives, in 
combination, would help push Al Qaeda into a charismatically unstable zone and 
thus reduce its charismatic effect. This would then reduce the violence-making 
abilities of Al Qaeda or even make it dysfunctional.  
While the thesis collected evidence of the presence of charismatic effect in 
Al Qaeda and its current level of flux and control through available assessment 
and evidence in the literature, a more scientific approach would be by a 
sociometric questionnaire to former members of Al Qaeda now in custody. Of 
course, we would have to assume that these individuals would respond truthfully. 
Similarly, we could also use Delphi techniques to assess quantitative values of 
flux and control in Al Qaeda by directly incorporating the acknowledged experts 
on Al Qaeda. 
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Another area that the study did not explore was the effect of charisma in 
the associate groups of Al Qaeda and the overall effect of charisma on the entire 
structure of Al Qaeda, comprised of the inner core, the intermediate layer formed 
by the associate groups, and the outer core formed by independent operators 
such as the Madrid bombers. Future studies could explore the effect of charisma 
in these areas. Similarly, we also need to validate the recommended strategies 
by exploring whether certain groups in the past were contained by following 
these strategies before applying them to Al Qaeda. Alternatively, we could try the 
measures suggested on smaller, regional groups before applying them on Al 
Qaeda. 
Finally, there also exists the option to apply the other two strategies of 
destabilization, i.e., ossification and volatility strategy. The study did not suggest 
these strategies because of the higher level of risks involved in implementing 
them. For example, if we were to apply the volatility strategy, it would involve 
increasing the level of flux and reducing the level of control in Al Qaeda. A smart 
opponent like Osama may take advantage of the artificial revving up and start 
concentrating on just focusing on preventing our efforts to reduce the level of 
control. The result would be a high level of flux and a high level of control; thus 
transforming Al Qaeda into a charismatically transformational organization once 
again capable of undertaking operations of the 9/11 type. However, future 
studies could focus on this approach and try to find mechanisms that would 
prevent the opponent from manipulating the changes caused by our efforts in his 
group. A similar risk would be involved in the implementation of the ossification 
strategy except that the direction of change of the two relational orders would 
change, i.e., flux would have to be reduced and control increased. In this case, 
the opponent would be at liberty to enhance the level of flux in the group and 
simultaneously take steps to prevent our efforts from reducing the level of flux in 
his group.  
To conclude, this thesis has attempted to understand the relationship 
between terrorism and charisma and arrive at possible ways to contain the 
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adverse affects caused by charisma-induced groups in the society. The study 
has also applied Bradley’s charismatic framework to analyze and manipulate the 
charismatic effect in a terrorist and insurgent group on one of the most wanted 
terror groups, Al Qaeda. The emir of Al Qaeda has the highest reward money (25 
million dollars) on his head; still he evades arrest. It is likely that our inability to 
apprehend him is due to the extreme cohesion between the leader and the led. 
Should we be able to reduce the flux and control to the region of insufficiency as 
illustrated in Bradley’s model, we might finally have some countermeasures to 
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APPENDIX A.  ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT LEVEL OF FLUX IN AL QAEDA 
Table 2.   Incidents / Events / Assessments by Experts Related to Flux 
 
Ser Year  Date Event Rater’s 
assessment  
Source  
1 2005 - People who bond tightly united by a team banner 
or a shared goal or belief system-feel 
empowered and ennobled by their membership 
in an exclusive club of like-minded people. 
Membership can be a powerful cult-like 
experience. Examples flood the mind: churches, 
Hitler’s SS… terror groups like Hezbollah and Al 
Qaeda. 
 Management Secrets 
of the New England 
Patriots: Building a 
High-Performance 
Organization,    By 
James Lavin, Edition: 
illustrated, Published 
by Pointer Press, 
2005. 
2 2005 July 
28, 
2005 
According to U.S. officials, Al Qaeda has lost 
most of its personnel and is now under siege in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan.  









The terrorist attack on Khobar, Saudi Arabia—
the hub of the Saudi oil industry—by four al-
Qaeda operatives on May 29, 2004, provided a 
significant morale boost for al-Qaeda. The attack 
resulted in the deaths of 22 foreigners. The jihadi 
 Terrorism Monitor 
Volume: 4 Issue: 
16august 11, 2006 
02:27 Pm Age: 3 Yrs, 
By: Abdul Hameed 
Bakier                   
Event Took Place in 
2004, However, since 
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forums used this attack to boast about their 
strength and the righteousness of their cause.  
the report on Al 
Qaeda’s is dated In 







Al Qaeda’s resurgence is a self-fulfilling U.S. 
prophecy:  









5 2008 May 
29, 
2008 
Al Qaeda and Taliban have regrouped, rearmed, 
and retrained in safe havens in the Pashtun 
tribal lands that straddle the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border. The Pakistan army's 
incursion into the tribal zone was defeated; the 
new, less-pro-U.S. government in Islamabad is 
suing for peace with the tribes. The Muslim world 
perceives that the U.S. military is being defeated 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. This advances each 
part of al-Qaeda's doctrine for fighting America – 
casualties, costs, and disunity – and it has been 
achieved without a follow-up-to-9/11 attack.  





6 2008 Jun 
17, 
Our loss in Vietnam forever shattered the 
domestic consensus in favor of the Cold War, 
 Al-Qaeda’s Vietnam -
An Islamist backlash.  
By Rich Lowry, 
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2008 creating a crisis of national confidence known as 
the Vietnam Syndrome. Al-Qaeda’s troubles in 
Iraq correspond with a similar unraveling of its 
ideological cohesion. Reports in The New 
Yorker and The New Republic recently have 
detailed an Islamist backlash against al-Qaeda’s 








Bhutto’s death on December 27, as well as the 
previous attempts on her life, really exemplifies 
the fact that the Al Qaeda and Taliban have 
created the rudiments of a radical Islamic state 
in the mountains of the Hindu Kush, with enough 
power, cohesion and political reach anywhere in 
the region. 









U.S. Failure Breeds a Stronger al-Qaeda. A   
failed military strategy spawns a far more 
dangerous movement that could engulf Pakistan 
as well as Afghanistan. 











 A recently intercepted communiqué consisting 
of a batch of subject-related letters between the 
leadership of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and al-
Qaeda’s senior leadership in Pakistan offers an 
interesting window into the infighting within its 








ranks. The main theme of this correspondence 
relates to AQI leader Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, 
a.k.a. Abu Ayyub al-Masri. It details criticism of 
his performance, and complaints about his 







"The end is in sight in the sense that, it is very 
difficult for Al Qaeda to attack the United States 
right now. On the other hand, they're patient, 
they think god is on their side. They are going to 
be around for a while. Al Qaeda in Iraq is 
weakened. Al Qaeda on the Afghan/Pakistan 
border is stronger. 
 Peter Bergen 
Discusses State of Al 




ml, (Accessed on 
March 30, 2009). 
 
11 2008 July 
29, 
2008 
From horror, incomprehension, and the rush to 
conclude that "They hate us for our freedoms" – 
typical of the post-Sept. 11 response – there is 
now a shift toward viewing Al Qaeda as a 
fractious group that can be subverted and 
defeated by manipulating its internal divisions. 
 “How the best and the 
brightest plan to fight 
terrorism; “A peek at 
how the next 
generation will tackle 







1-coop.html   
(accessed on March 
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30, 2009). 
12 2008 June 
28, 
2008 
"There may be a wave of violence right now, but 
... in five years, al-Qaida will be more isolated 
than ever. No one will give a toss about them," 
he says. And, given the religio-ideological basis 
of al-Qaida’s jihad, the religious condemnation 
being offered by scholars and fighters once 
close to the organization is arguably the most 
important development. 
 “Osama bin Laden is 
losing the fight within,” 
Peter Bergen and 







8&q=html  (accessed 





Al-Qaeda 'less capable and effective': U.S. intel 
chief. At the same time, however, Blair noted Al-







14 2009 March 
5, 
2009 
By 2007 the U.S. intelligence community was 
publicly warning that Al Qaeda had 
“reconstituted some of its pre-9/11 operational 
capabilities through replacement of captured or 
killed operational lieutenants, and the restoration 
of some central control by its top leaders.”  
 Excerpts from 
“threats, options, and 
risks in Pakistan,” A 
report by centre for 
American progress, 





15 2009 March 
5, 
2009 
In a testimony before the Senate Intelligence 
Committee, Director of National Intelligence 
Admiral Dennis Blair credited a “succession of 
blows” against Al Qaeda’s senior command 
structure for their “potential to further degrade its 
organizational cohesion.”  
 
16 2009 March 
5, 
2009 
Osama bin Laden’s terror movement has thus 
far proven resilient and able to adapt to these 
pressures. Pakistani intelligence officials have 
expressed fears that, in the face of punishing 
Predator strikes, Al Qaeda operations will diffuse 
“to conduct decentralized operations under small 
but well-organized regional groups.”  
 
html, (Accessed On 
Mar 30, 2009). 
Total Positive Control Value   “ + ”   
Total negative assessment values  “ – ”   
Level of control = {∑+/ ∑+ &  - }     





Average Mean of 16 Raters 0.5979
Standard Deviation 0.0959
Upper Range 0f  Control 0.6938






Table 3.   Calculation of the Current Level of Flux 






R13 R14 R15 R16 
1 People who bond tightly united by a 
team banner or a shared goal or 
belief system-feel empowered and 
ennobled by their membership in an 
exclusive club of like-minded people. 
Membership can be powerful cult like 
experience. Examples flood the mind: 
churches, Hitler’s SS… terror groups 
like Hezbollah and Al Qaeda.(p. 29) 
1 1 1 1 0.75 0.75 0.75 1 0.5 1 1 +1 1 1 1 1
2 According to US officials, Al-Qaeda 
has lost most of its personnel and is 
now under siege in Pakistan and 
Afghanistan.  
-1 0 -1 1 -0.5 -1-0.75 -1 -1 -1 -0.5 -.75 -0.75 -1 -1 0
3 The terrorist attack on Khobar, Saudi 
Arabia—the hub of the Saudi oil 
industry—by four al-Qaeda 
operatives on May 29, 2004, 
provided a significant morale boost 
for al-Qaeda. The attack resulted in 
the deaths of 22 foreigners. The 
jihadi forums used this attack to 
boast about their strength and the 
1 1 1 1 0.5 0.75 1 1 0.5 1 -0.5 +1 1 1 0.5 1
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righteousness of their cause.  
4 Al Qaeda’s resurgence is a self-
fulfilling US prophecy:  
1 1 1 1 0.5 0.5 -0.5 0.75 -1 0.75 -0.5 +1 0.75 1 0.5 0
5 Al Qaeda and Taliban have 
regrouped, rearmed, and retrained in 
safe havens in the Pashtun tribal 
lands that straddle the Pakistan-
Afghanistan border. The Pakistan 
army's incursion into the tribal zone 
was defeated; the new, less-pro-U.S. 
government in Islamabad is suing for 
peace with the tribes. The Muslim 
world perceives that the U.S. military 
is being defeated in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. This advances each 
part of al-Qaeda's doctrine for 
fighting America – casualties, costs, 
and disunity – and it has been 
achieved without a follow-up-to-9/11 
attack.  
1 0.5 1 1 0.5 1 0.6 1 1 1 1 +1 1 1 1 1
6 Our loss in Vietnam forever shattered 
the domestic consensus in favor of 
the Cold War, creating a crisis of 
national confidence known as the 
-1-0.25 -0.6 1 -0.5-0.75 -0.6 -1 -0.5 -1 -1 -.5 -1 -1 -0.5 -1
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Vietnam Syndrome. Al-Qaeda’s 
troubles in Iraq correspond with a 
similar unraveling of its ideological 
cohesion. Reports in The New 
Yorker and The New 
Republic recently have detailed an 
Islamist backlash against al-Qaeda’s 
indiscriminate killing in Iraq. 
7 Her death on December 27, as well 
as the previous attempt on her life 
after she reached Karachi, really 
exemplifies the fact that the 
Taliban/Al Qaeda nexus has created 
the rudiments of a radical Islamic 
state in the mountains of the Hindu 
Kush, with enough power, cohesion 
and political reach anywhere in the 
region. 
1 1 1 -1 -0.5 0.75 0.6 0.75 1 1 1 +1 1 1 0.5 1
8 US Failure Breeds a Stronger al-
Qaeda. A   failed military strategy 
spawns a far more dangerous 
movement that could engulf Pakistan 
as well as Afghanistan. 
1 1 1 -1 0.5 1 0.6 1 1 0.75 1 +.5 1 -1 0 0
9  A recently intercepted communiqué -1 -0.5 -1 -1 -1-0.75 -0.6 -0.75 -1-0.75 -1 -1 -0.75 -1 -1 -0.5
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consisting of a batch of subject-
related letters between the leadership 
of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and al-
Qaeda’s senior leadership 
in Pakistan offers an interesting 
window into the infighting within its 
ranks. The main theme of this 
correspondence relates to AQI leader 
Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, a.k.a. Abu 
Ayyub al-Masri. It details criticism of 
his performance, and complaints 
about his capability to continue in his 
role.  
10 "The end is in sight in the sense that, 
it is very difficult for Al Qaeda to 
attack the United States right now. 
On the other hand, they're patient, 
they think god is on their side. They 
are going to be around for a while. Al 
Qaeda in Iraq is weakened. Al Qaeda 
on the Afghan/Pakistan border is 
stronger. 
0.5 1 1 +1 0.5 0.25 1 0.75 0.5 0 0.6 +.75 1 0.5 0 0
11 From horror, incomprehension, and 
the rush to conclude that "They hate 
us for our freedoms" – typical of the 
-0.5 0 -1 -1 -0.5 1 -0.5 -0.6 -1 -0.5-0.75 -.75 -1 -0.5 0 0.5
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post-Sept. 11 response – there is 
now a shift toward viewing Al Qaeda 
as a fractious group that can be 
subverted and defeated by 
manipulating its internal divisions. 
12 "There may be a wave of violence 
right now, but ... in five years, al-
Qaida will be more isolated than 
ever. No one will give a toss about 
them," he says. And, given the 
religio-ideological basis of al-Qaida’s 
jihad, the religious condemnation 
being offered by scholars and fighters 
once close to the organization is 
arguably the most important 
development. 
-0.5-0.75 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 0.5 -0.5 -0.75 -1 -0.5 -0.6 -1 -1 -0.5 -1 0.5
13 Al-Qaeda 'less capable and effective': 
US intel chief. At the same time, 
however, Blair noted Al-Qaeda 
threats arising in other areas. 
-0.5 0 -0.5 -1 -0.5 0.75 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 0 -0.5 -.5 -1 -0.5 0 0
14 By 2007 the U.S. intelligence 
community was publicly warning that 
Al Qaeda had “reconstituted some of 
its pre-9/11 operational capabilities 
1 0.5 1 -1 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.75 0.5 +.75 1 1 1 1
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through replacement of captured or 
killed operational lieutenants, and the 
restoration of some central control by 
its top leaders.”  
15 In a testimony before the Senate 
Intelligence Committee, Director of 
National Intelligence Admiral Dennis 
Blair credited a “succession of blows” 
against Al Qaeda’s senior command 
structure for their “potential to further 
degrade its organizational 
cohesion.”  
-1 -1 -1 1 -0.5 0 -0.5 -1 -1 -1-0.75 -1 -0.5 -1 -0.5 -0.5
16 Osama bin Laden’s terror movement 
has thus far proven resilient and able 
to adapt to these pressures. 
Pakistani intelligence officials have 
expressed fears that, in the face of 
punishing Predator strikes, Al Qaeda 
operations will diffuse “to conduct 
decentralized operations under small 
but well-organized regional groups.”  
1 0.5 1 1 1 1 0.6 1 1 1 0.5 +1 1 1 0.5 1
17 Total Positive Flux Value 8.5 7.5 9 7 4.75 8.75 5.75 8.05 6 7.25 5.6 8 8.75 7.5 5 7
18 Total negative assessment   -5.5 -2.5 -5.6 -5.5 -4.6 -2.5-4.55 -5.6 -7-4.75 -6.1 -5.5 -6 -6.5 -4 -2
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19 Total absolute values of 
assessments, ignoring the 
negative sign 
14 10 14.6 12.5 9.35 1.25 10.3 3.65 13 12 11.7 13.5 14.75 14 9 9
20 Mean Flux =Sum of All “+” 
/Absolute sum of all “+” and all   “ 
































List of Raters R1 – R16 
1. R1: Major Jason Brightman – US Air Force – Attending National Security Affairs Master’s Program at Naval 
Postgraduate School 
2. R2: Major Florinel – Romanian Army - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate 
School 
3. R3: Lt Col Zahid Mann – Pakistan Army – Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval 
Postgraduate School 
4. R4: Major Mushtaq Rehan – Pakistan Army - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval 
Postgraduate School 
5. R5: Wing Commander Qaiser Janjua Md. – Pakistan Air Force - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s 
Program at Naval Postgraduate School 
6. R6: Major Chris Pratt – USSOF - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program At Naval Postgraduate 
School 
7. R7: Major Dennis Heaney – USSOF - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate 
School 
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8. R8: Cpt Rich Hagner – USSOF - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program At Naval Postgraduate 
School  
9. R9: Major Stephen Schnell – USSOF - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate 
School 
10. R10: Major Mark D. Metzger – US Army - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval 
Postgraduate School 
11. R11: Major J Kennedy – USSOF - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate 
School 
12. R12: Major Felton Smith – US Army - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate 
School 
13. R13: Lt Cdr Birech Roberts – Kenyan Navy - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval 
Postgraduate School 
14. R14: Col Khajji Khaliffa – Tunisian Army - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval 
Postgraduate School 
15. R15: Mr Volodymyr Orativskyi  - Security Services of Ukraine - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s 
Program at Naval Postgraduate School 
16. R16: Retired Colonel (Indian Army) S Rana – Former Faculty Nsa Department – Naval Postgraduate 




APPENDIX B.  ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT LEVEL OF CONTROL IN AL QAEDA 
Table 4.   Incidents / Events / Assessments by Experts Related to Level of Control in Al Qaeda 
Ser Year  Date Event Rater’s 
assessment  
Source  
1 2005 January 
27, 2005 
Most would agree bin Laden's operations have 
been marginalized. Fearful of missile-laden drones 
and the crosshairs of a sniper's scope, the tall, 
lanky one has stopped making videos of afternoon 
strolls through the wastelands of Afghanistan with 
his convoy of doting bodyguards. Like Hitler in his 
bunker, Osama has gone underground, but not 
far enough down to stop him from calling 
signals to his team players. 
 January 27th, 2005              
letter #7 from Saudi Arabia. 
Bin Laden and Iraq. R.F. 
Burton. 
2 2005 July 
2005 
The back-to-back nature of the deadly attacks in 
Egypt and London, as well as similarities in the 
methods used, suggests that the al Qaeda 
leadership may have given the orders for both 
operations. It is a clear sign that Osama bin Laden 
and his deputies remain in control of the network, 
according to interviews with counterterrorism 
analysts and government officials in Europe and 
the Middle East. 
 Al Qaeda Leaders Seen In 
Control, By Craig Whitlock 













 “I think its wishful thinking to think that he (Osama) 
isn't, in control. The one Example is the 
tremendous sophistication and spontaneity of his 
media machine. There has to be some command 
and control there. And to imagine that it doesn't--
that he's unable to do it is just incorrect. He's really 
a remarkable man, …. He's changed the course of 
history.”   Michael Scheuer 
 Excerpts of meet the press 






(accessed on mar 31, 2009). 
4 2006 Jul 2006 Terrorism is a real threat, but “Al Qaeda” is less of 
an organization than it is an impulse. And while 
“bin Laden” isn't the all-powerful terrorist 
mastermind he's often portrayed to be, the war in 
Iraq, Guantánamo, extraordinary renditions, and 
other Bush Administration brainstorms have 
ensured that his message is broadcast loud and 
clear throughout the world. 
 Harpers Magazine 










Lonely, marginalized, and suddenly suspicious that 
he was losing his grip over the organization he 
helped create, Osama bin Laden finally decided 
that enough was enough. At least that’s the 
explanation sources close to him are giving for 
 “Osama bin laden losing 






(Accessed On March 31, 
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why, after three long years of silence, the Qaeda 
leader has released one video and two audiotapes.  
According to Omar Farooqi, a Taliban liaison 
officer with Al Qaeda, bin Laden recently learned 
that a faction within his own organization had been 





These are the masterminds of tremendous terrorist 
attacks against the United States. They're  still  
important in terms of the ideological movement, if 
less so in terms of the operational control of al-
Qaeda.Mr. Michael Sheehan (NBC News 
Terrorism Analyst) 
 Excerpts of a panel 
discussion conducted by 
NBC correspondent David 
Gregory. 
7 2007 Not 
Known  
 He accomplishes the goal of maintaining some 
international currency while apparently doing very 
little other than releasing video and/or audio 
tapes. …while bin laden may still be alive, his 
relevance should be dying out. 
 Analysis: On The 
(Ir)Relevance Of Osama Bin 





Laden/ (Accessed On March 
31, 2009). 
8 2007  Senior U.S. intelligence officials said Bin Laden 
remains in control of al-Qaeda's central command 
and that its leadership council still reports to him. 
But they said Bin Laden weighs in on major 
management decisions less frequently than in the 
 Al-Qaeda's New Leadership    





nladen.html (Accessed On 
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past because of his inaccessibility. March 31, 2009). 




Three or four years ago, Sageman's "bunch of 
guys" bottom-up thesis about the nature of the 
contemporary terrorist threat may have seemed 
compelling. But ever since the July 7, 2005, 
attacks in London and the plot to bomb airplanes 
over the Atlantic that was foiled in August 2006, 
evidence has continually come to light about al 
Qaeda Central's top-down direction of these and 
other operations. Al Qaeda Central has 
reconstituted itself in Pakistan's tribal frontier 
areas. It is again actively directing and initiating 
international terrorist operations on a grand scale.    
Bruce Hoffman 
 
10 2008 July / 
August  
2008 
Al Qaeda Central is of course not dead, but it is 
still contained operationally.... The surviving 
leaders of al Qaeda are undoubtedly still plotting to 
do harm to various countries in the world and have 
the expertise to do so, but they are hampered by 
the global security measures that have been put in 
place.  Marc Sagemen 
 
“Does osama still call the 
shots?”“debating the 
containment of al qaeda's 
leadership,”  bruce hoffman 
and marc sagemen  






call-the-shots  (accessed on 
march 31, 2009) 
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11 2008 July 
2008 
In recent months, an impressive cast of terrorism 
experts and counterterrorism officials around the 
world has coalesced around the notion that al-
Qaeda's leader is no longer an active threat to the 
West. They point out that he has not been able to 
strike on U.S. soil since 9/11 or in Europe since the 
London bombings three summers ago.  
 “Does Osama bin Laden still 
matter?”       By Peter 




(Accessed On March 31, 
2009) 
12 2008 July 
2008 
But the best available evidence suggests that the 
threat posed by bin Laden's acolytes hasn't been 
extinguished — and his own influence over them is 
greater than many analysts acknowledge. The 
Taliban is resurgent in Afghanistan, and in 
Pakistan militant groups have grown so aggressive 
that in late June they even threatened to take over 
a major city — Peshawar. Farther away, extremists 
in Europe and North Africa continue to covet bin 
Laden's blessing and the al-Qaeda brand name. 
 “Does Osama bin Laden still 





(accessed on march 31, 
2009) 
13 2008 July 
2008 
It's true that many of the "leaderless jihadis" have 
set up operations independently of al-Qaeda, but 
when they turn to bin Laden's organization, it's not 
just for inspiration but also for training, assistance 
and direction — in short, for leadership. Many are 
able and willing to do bin Laden's bidding; they pay 
 “Does Osama bin Laden still 




topics (accessed on march 
31, 2009). 
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very careful attention to his Internet postings and 
follow his instructions. … But al-Qaeda's most 
dangerous weapon has always been 
unpredictability. While he remains at large, the 
jihad will never be leaderless. 
14 2008   The Al-Qaeda leadership is responsible for the 
most devastating terrorist attack in history – and it 
is still free and at large. Except the 9-11 
operational shura leader, Khalid Sheikh Mohamed, 
who conceived and planned the operation, and 
Abu Hafs alias Mohamed Atef, the Emir of the 
Military Committee of al-Qaeda, most of the 
consultative council (Majlis shura) members are 
either free in tribal Pakistan or in detention in Iran. 
Gunaratna  
 Symposium: Al-Qaeda's 
Central Leadership, Jamie 
Glazov, 
FrontPageMagazine.com | 





on March 31, 2009). 
15 2008  As to the relevance of al-Qaeda's senior 
leadership (AQSL), they are as critical today as 
they were September 10, 2001. Many like to 
further the notion that AQSL is no longer important, 
that al-Qaeda has transformed into a 'leaderless 
jihad' and a global decentralized movement from a 
centralized controlled cadre of terrorists. To put it 
succinctly, it's not one or the other and it's not a 
 Symposium: Al-Qaeda's 
Central Leadership, By Jamie 
Glazov, 
FrontPageMagazine.com | 





on March 31, 2009). 
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zero sum game. For those who would still contest 
that al-Qaeda is simply a decentralized movement, 
they must then also answer why the movements 
are still reactively driven by Internet propaganda 
communications that still come primarily via al-
Qaeda's senior leadership through al-Qaeda's 
established - and quite centralized - production 
organizations, such as as-Sahab. Nothing is official 
- such as the recent death of Abu Laith al-Libi - 
until as-Sahab says so...because as-
Sahab is AQSL. And AQSL has lost zero 
relevance.  Schippert 
16 2008   Presently, Al-Qaeda is merely reduced to an 
ideological and strategic brain for the global jihad, 
transferring its violent ideology to like-minded 
previously local militant groups operating in the 
length and breadth of the Muslim world. The fact 
that AQSL has failed to conduct even a single 
attack in the US … speaks amply of the 
degradation of the organization to merely a 
propaganda tool that feels intent on releasing 
videos and messages of hate to its audience in the 
Muslim world. Bukhari 
 Bukhari, Symposium: Al-
Qaeda's Central Leadership, 
By Jamie Glazov 
FrontPageMagazine.com | 





(accessed on March 31, 
2009). 
 122
17 2008  Burke argues that the “nearest thing to ‘Al-Qaeda,’ 
as popularly understood,” only existed for a five-
year period, and the battle of Tora Bora in 
December 2001 showcased “the final scenes of its 
destruction.” Stratfor’s Peter Zeihan argued that 
while a few thousand people may claim to be al-
Qaeda members, “the real Al Qaeda does not 
exercise any control over them.” In late January of 
this year, State Department counterterrorism 
coordinator Dell Dailey described al-Qaeda’s top 
leadership as isolated, saying they have “much, 
much less central authority and much, much less 




As quoted by David Ross, 
Symposium: Al-Qaeda's 
Central Leadership, By 
Jamie Glazov, 
FrontPageMagazine.com | 





(accessed on March 31, 
2009). 
 
18 2008  The renewed importance of AQSL can be 
illustrated by comparing plots where it was 
involved (either in training or command and 
control) to plots whose operatives were self-
financed and self-trained. The Fort Dix plotters had 
terrible operational security, actually taking a video 
of themselves firing weapons and yelling in a 
foreign tongue to Circuit City to be transferred to 
DVD. The hydrogen peroxide in the explosives 
used by Britain’s 7/21 bombers failed to react.” 
 David Ross, Symposium: Al-
Qaeda's Central Leadership, 
By Jamie Glazov, 
FrontPageMagazine.com | 





(accessed on March 31, 
2009). 
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Localized cells recognize that they need to link up 
with international networks. The Miami cell that 
allegedly wanted to destroy Chicago’s Sears 
Tower reached out to al-Qaeda because they 
doubted they could succeed on their own. While 
AQSL’s propaganda campaign has been the most 
noticeable facet of its operations over the past few 
years, the available evidence suggests that it is 
operationally relevant as well. A strong central 
leadership makes the group more formidable, with 
greater destructive potential.  
19 2008 June 20, 
2008 
Schippert refers to "al Qaeda Senior Leadership" 
(AQSL) to identify Osama bin Laden's group 
operating in FATA. It may create the wrong 
impression that AQSL is not a group but a few 
senior leaders without members directly controlled 
by them. AQ is very much a group. Core Al Qaeda 
is still capable but is investing a bulk of its 
operational resources to build the associated 
groups and its ideological resources to build the 
homegrown cells from its new home in FATA. 
 Gunaratna, Symposium: Al-
Qaeda's Central Leadership, 
By Jamie Glazov, 
FrontPageMagazine.com | 




ab61d1b689c6 (accessed on 
March 31, 2009). 
20 2009 January 
14, 2009 
"No matter how isolated bin Laden is, [the tape 
shows] that he is following current events and 
 “Osama to Obama: "I'm Still 




maintains the ability to comment on them and get 
his message out there."  
m/posts/2009/01/14/osama
_to_obama_im_still_here 
(Accessed On March 30, 
2009). 
21 2009 January 
14, 2009 
After six years of war, he (Obama) said, "it has not 
gotten better and things are going to get tougher in 
Afghanistan before they get better."  
 
“Obama: Osama still the no. 1 
threat” Australian 
Associated Press  
http://www.livenews.com.a
u/article/index/167793?cha
nnel=home (accessed on 
march 30, 2009). 
Total Positive Control Value   “ + ”   
Total negative assessment values  “ – ”   




















Table 5.   Calculation of Control Value From Assessment of Various Raters 
Ser  Assessments /Events/ Evidence of 
control  




1 Most would agree bin Laden's 
operations have been marginalized. 
Fearful of missile-laden drones and 
the crosshairs of a sniper's scope, the 
tall, lanky one has stopped making 
videos of afternoon strolls through the 
wastelands of Afghanistan with his 
convoy of doting bodyguards. Like 
Hitler in his bunker, Osama has gone 
underground, but not far enough 
down to stop him from calling signals 
























2 The back-to-back nature of the deadly 
attacks in Egypt and London, as well 
as similarities in the methods used, 
suggests that the al Qaeda leadership 
may have given the orders for both 
operations. It is a clear sign that 
Osama bin Laden and his deputies 
remain in control of the network, 
according to interviews with 






















government officials in Europe and 
the Middle East. 
3 “I think its wishful thinking to think that 
he (Osama) isn't, in control. The one 
Example is the tremendous 
sophistication and spontaneity of his 
media machine. There has to be 
some command and control there. 
And to imagine that it doesn't--that 
he's unable to do it is just incorrect. 
He's really a remarkable man, …. 


















4 Terrorism is a real threat, but “Al 
Qaeda” is less of an organization than 
it is an impulse. And while “bin Laden” 
isn't the all-powerful terrorist 
mastermind he's often portrayed to 
be, the war in Iraq, Guantánamo, 
extraordinary renditions, and other 
Bush Administration brainstorms have 
ensured that his message is 
























5 Lonely, marginalized, and suddenly 
suspicious that he was losing his grip 
over the organization he helped 
create, Osama bin Laden finally 
decided that enough was enough. At 
least that’s the explanation sources 
close to him are giving for why, after 
three long years of silence, the Qaeda 
leader has released one video and 
two audiotapes.  According to Omar 
Farooqi, a Taliban liaison officer with 
Al Qaeda, bin Laden recently learned 
that a faction within his own 


















6 These are the masterminds of 
tremendous terrorist attacks against 
the United States. They're  still  
important in terms of the ideological 
movement, if less so in terms of the 
operational control of al-Qaeda.    Mr. 
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maintaining some international 
currency while apparently doing very 
little other than releasing video and/or 
audio tapes. …while bin laden may 
still be alive, his relevance should be 
dying out. 
5 5 5 6 5 5
8 Senior U.S. intelligence officials said 
Bin Laden remains in control of al-
Qaeda's central command and that its 
leadership council still reports to him. 
But they said Bin Laden weighs in on 
major management decisions less 




















9 Three or four years ago, Sageman's 
"bunch of guys" bottom-up thesis 
about the nature of the contemporary 
terrorist threat may have seemed 
compelling. But ever since the July 7, 
2005, attacks in London and the plot 
to bomb airplanes over the Atlantic 
that was foiled in August 2006, 
evidence has continually come to light 
about al Qaeda Central's top-down 
direction of these and other 
operations. Al Qaeda Central has 
reconstituted itself in Pakistan's tribal 
frontier areas. It is again actively 
directing and initiating international 



















10 Al Qaeda Central is of course not 
dead, but it is still contained 
operationally.... The surviving leaders 
of al Qaeda are undoubtedly still 
plotting to do harm to various 
countries in the world and have the 
expertise to do so, but they are 
































measures that have been put in place 
Marc Sagemen 
11 In recent months, an impressive cast 
of terrorism experts and 
counterterrorism officials around the 
world has coalesced around the 
notion that al-Qaeda's leader is no 
longer an active threat to the West. 
They point out that he has not been 
able to strike on U.S. soil since 9/11 
or in Europe since the London 























12 But the best available evidence 
suggests that the threat posed by bin 
Laden's acolytes hasn't been 
extinguished — and his own influence 
over them is greater than many 
analysts acknowledge. The Taliban is 
resurgent in Afghanistan, and in 
Pakistan militant groups have grown 
so aggressive that in late June they 
even threatened to take over a major 
city — Peshawar. Farther away, 
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continue to covet bin Laden's blessing 
and the al-Qaeda brand name. 
13 It's true that many of the "leaderless 
jihadis" have set up operations 
independently of al-Qaeda, but when 
they turn to bin Laden's organization, 
it's not just for inspiration but also for 
training, assistance and direction — in 
short, for leadership. Many are able 
and willing to do bin Laden's bidding; 
they pay very careful attention to his 
Internet postings and follow his 
instructions. … But al-Qaeda's most 
dangerous weapon has always been 
unpredictability. While he remains at 
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14  The Al-Qaeda leadership is 
responsible for the most devastating 
terrorist attack in history – and it is still 
free and at large. Except the 9-11 
operational shura leader, Khalid 
Sheikh Mohamed, who conceived and 
planned the operation, and Abu Hafs 
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Military Committee of al-Qaeda, most 
of the consultative council (Majlis 
shura) members are either free in 
tribal Pakistan or in detention in Iran. 
Gunaratna 
15 As to the relevance of al-Qaeda's 
senior leadership (AQSL), they are as 
critical today as they were September 
10, 2001. Many like to further the 
notion that AQSL is no longer 
important, that al-Qaeda has 
transformed into a 'leaderless jihad' 
and a global decentralized movement 
from a centralized controlled cadre of 
terrorists. To put it succinctly, it's not 
one or the other and it's not a zero 
sum game. For those who would still 
contest that al-Qaeda is simply a 
decentralized movement, they must 
then also answer why the movements 
are still reactively driven by Internet 
propaganda communications that still 
come primarily via al-Qaeda's senior 
leadership through al-Qaeda's 
established - and quite centralized - 











production organizations, such as as-
Sahab. Nothing is official - such as the 
recent death of Abu Laith al-Libi - until 
as-Sahab says so...because as-
Sahab is AQSL. And AQSL has lost 
zero relevance.                      
Schippert 
16  Presently, Al-Qaeda is merely 
reduced to an ideological and 
strategic brain for the global jihad, 
transferring its violent ideology to like-
minded previously local militant 
groups operating in the length and 
breadth of the Muslim world. The fact 
that AQSL has failed to conduct even 
a single attack in the US … speaks 
amply of the degradation of the 
organization to merely a propaganda 
tool that feels intent on releasing 
videos and messages of hate to its 
audience in the Muslim world.                
Bukhari 























17 Burke argues that the “nearest thing 
to ‘Al-Qaeda,’ as popularly 
understood,” only existed for a five-


















year period, and the battle of Tora 
Bora in December 2001 showcased 
“the final scenes of its destruction.” 
Stratfor’s Peter Zeihan argued that 
while a few thousand people may 
claim to be al-Qaeda members, “the 
real Al Qaeda does not exercise any 
control over them.” In late January of 
this year, State Department 
counterterrorism coordinator Dell 
Dailey described al-Qaeda’s top 
leadership as isolated, saying they 
have “much, much less central 
authority and much, much less 
capability to reach out.”  
5 5 
18 The renewed importance of AQSL can 
be illustrated by comparing plots 
where it was involved (either in 
training or command and control) to 
plots whose operatives were self-
financed and self-trained. The Fort Dix 
plotters had terrible operational 
security, actually taking a video of 
themselves firing weapons and yelling 


















transferred to DVD. The hydrogen 
peroxide in the explosives used by 
Britain’s 7/21 bombers failed to react.” 
Localized cells recognize that they 
need to link up with international 
networks. The Miami cell that 
allegedly wanted to destroy Chicago’s 
Sears Tower reached out to al-Qaeda 
because they doubted they could 
succeed on their own. While AQSL’s 
propaganda campaign has been the 
most noticeable facet of its operations 
over the past few years, the available 
evidence suggests that it is 
operationally relevant as well. A 
strong central leadership makes the 
group more formidable, with greater 
destructive potential.  
19 Schippert refers to "al Qaeda Senior 
Leadership" (AQSL) to identify Osama 
bin Laden's group operating in FATA. 
It may create the wrong impression 
that AQSL is not a group but a few 
senior leaders without members 



















much a group. Core Al Qaeda is still 
capable but is investing a bulk of its 
operational resources to build the 
associated groups and its ideological 
resources to build the homegrown 
cells from its new home in FATA. 
20 "No matter how isolated bin Laden is, 
[the tape shows] that he is following 
current events and maintains the 
ability to comment on them and get 
his message out there."  




















21 After six years of war, he (Obama) 
said, "it has not gotten better and 
things are going to get tougher in 
Afghanistan before they get better."  
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24 Total values of assessments 






















22 Mean of Each Rater =Sum of All 
+ve/Absolute sum of all +ve and –ve 


































Overall aggregated value of Control in Al Qaeda 
Average Mean of 16 Raters 0.6542
Standard Deviation 0.0784
Upper Range 0f  Control   0.7326
Lower Range of Control 0.5758
List of Raters R1 – R16 
1. R1: Major Jason Brightman, US Air Force – Attending National Security Affairs Master’s Program at Naval 
Postgraduate School 
2. R2: Major Florinel – Romanian Army - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate 
School 
3. R3: Lt Col Zahid Mann – Pakistan Army – Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval 
Postgraduate School 
4. R4: Major Mushtaq Rehan – Pakistan Army - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval 
Postgraduate School 
5. R5: Wing Commander Qaiser Janjua Md. – Pakistan Air Force - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s 
Program at Naval Postgraduate School 
6. R6: Major Chris Pratt – USSOF - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program At Naval Postgraduate 
School 
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7. R7: Major Dennis Heaney – USSOF - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate 
School 
8. R8: Cpt Rich Hagner – USSOF - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program At Naval Postgraduate 
School  
9. R9: Major Stephen Schnell – USSOF - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate 
School 
10. R10: Major Mark D. Metzger – US Army - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval 
Postgraduate School 
11. R11: Major J Kennedy – USSOF - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate 
School 
12. R12: Major Felton Smith – US Army - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval Postgraduate 
School 
13. R13: Lt Cdr Birech Roberts – Kenyan Navy - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval 
Postgraduate School 
14. R14: Col Khajji Khaliffa – Tunisian Army - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s Program at Naval 
Postgraduate School 
15. R15: Mr Volodymyr Orativskyi  - Security Services of Ukraine - Attending Defense Analysis Master’s 
Program at Naval Postgraduate School 
16. R16: Retired Colonel (Indian Army) S Rana – Former Faculty Nsa Department – Naval Postgraduate 
School, and now Professor In The Defense Language School, Monterey
 139
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Amir, Taheri. Review of the Spirit of Allah. 1985th ed. Vol. 2008.Adler & Adler, 
1985..  
Andreas, Joel. "The Structure of Charismatic Mobilization: A Case Study of 
Rebellion during the Chinese Cultural Revolution." American Sociological 
Review 72, no. 3 (June  2007): 434.  
Anonymous. Through our Enemies' Eyes:  Osama Bin Laden, Radical Islam, and 
the Future of America. 1st pbk ed. Washington, D.C: Brassey's, 2003.  
Bass, Bernard M. Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations. New York; 
London: Free Press; Collier Macmillan, 1985.  
Bergen, Peter L. "Al Qaeda, the Organization: A Five-Year Forecast." The Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618, no. 1 (2008): 
14.  
———. Holy War, Inc.:  Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden. New York: 
Free Press, 2001.  
———. "Tape shows Gaza Conflict 'Big Deal' to Bin Laden." 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/01/14/bin.laden.bergen/index.html 
(accessed February 9, 2009).  
Bornstein, David. How to Change the World:  Social Entrepreneurs and the 
Power of New Ideas. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.  
Bradley, Raymond Trevor. "Dialogue, Information, and Psychological 
Organization." In The Transformative Power of Dialogue, edited by Nancy L. 
Roberts. First Edition ed. Vol. Volume 12, 243 - 288. Amsterdem, Boston, 
London, New York, Oxford, Paris, San Diego, San Francisco, Singapore, 
Sydney, Tokyo: JAI, 2002.  
———. Charisma and Social Structure:  A Study of Love and Power, Wholeness 
and Transformation. New York, N.Y: Paragon House Publishers, 1987.  
Brafman, Ori and Rod A. Beckstrom. The Starfish and the Spider:  The 
Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations. New York: Portfolio, 2006.  
Byman, Daniel. "Understanding Proto-Insurgencies: RAND Counterinsurgency 
Study -- Paper 3." RAND Corporation. 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP178/ (accessed March 19, 
2009).  
 140
Byman, Daniel, Michael Scheuer, Anatol Lieven, and W. Patrick Lang. "Iraq, 
Afghanistan and the War on "Terror"." Middle East Policy 12, no. 1 (Spring 
2005): 1.  
Charles P. Cell. "Charismatic Heads of State: The Social Context." Cross-
Cultural Research 9, no. 4 (1974): 255.  
Chris, Hawke. "U.S.: Terror Funding Stymied, Official Says $147 Million Frozen 
Under U.N. Sanctions - CBS News." 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/01/11/terror/main666168.shtml 
(accessed February 11, 2009).  
Combating Terrorism Center. "Al Qaeda's Five Aspects of Power." CTC Sentinel. 
http://ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ (accessed February 8, 2009).  
Conger, Jay Alden and Rabindra Nath Kanungo. Charismatic Leadership in 
OrganizationsThousand Oaks, Calif.:  Sage Publications, c1998., 1998.  
Conger, Jay A., Rabindra N. Kanungo, Sanjay T. Menon, and Purnima Mathur. 
"Measuring Charisma: Dimensionality and Validity of the Conger-Kanungo 
Scale of Charismatic Leadership." Revue Canadienne Des Sciences De 
l'Administration 14, no. 3 (Sep, 1997): 290.  
Coser, Lewis A. "Greedy Institutions; Patterns of Undivided Commitment." Free 
Press, New York.  
Cronin, Audrey Kurth. "How Al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist 
Groups." International Security 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 7.  
Cronin, Audrey K. "Al Qaeda After the Iraq Conflict: Open CRS Network - CRS 
Reports for the People." http://opencrs.com/document/RS21529 (accessed 
February 5, 2009). 
D. Boje. "CHARISMA." http://cbae.nmsu.edu/~dboje/teaching/338/charisma.htm 
(accessed August  26, 2008).  
Daveed, Gartenstein-Ross. "Osama's Big Lie." Front Page Magazine. 
http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=45EDC923-C4E2-
4AE6-B756-439932B3C57C (accessed February 4, 2009).  
David C. Gompert. "Heads we Win -- the Cognitive Side of Counterinsurgency 
(COIN): RAND Counterinsurgency Study -- Paper 1." Rand Corporation. 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP168/ (accessed August 27, 
2008).  
Fernando, Reinares. "A Case Study of the January 2008 Suicide Bomb Plot in 
Barcelona." http://ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ (accessed February 8, 2009).  
 141
Freeman, Michael. "The Headless Horseman:  A Theoretical and Strategic 
Assessment of Leadership Targeting." Research in Leadership Targeting in 
Terrorist Movements, The Author is Professor at Naval Postgraduate School 
and Conduct Programme on International Terrorism and Terrorist Operations 
and Financing, Submitted for Publication.  
———. "Democracy, Al Oaeda, and the Causes of Terrorism: A Strategic 
Analysis of U.S. Policy." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 31, no. 1 (Jan 
2008): 40.  
Gardela, Karen and Hoffman, Bruce. "The RAND Chronology of International 
Terrorism for 1988." RAND Corporation. 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2007/R4180.pdf/ (accessed February 25, 
2009).  
Giraldo, Jeanne K. and Harold A. Trinkunas. Terrorism Financing and State 
Responses:  A Comparative Perspective. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University 
Press, 2007.  
Global Security. "Al-Qaida an Overview." 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-qaida.htm (accessed 
February 4, 2009).  
Gunaratna, Rohan. Inside Al Qaeda:  Global Network of Terror. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2002.  
H.D.S Greenway. "The Power of Charisma." http://www.boston.com/ (accessed 
August 25, 2008).  
Harmon, Christopher C. "The Myth of the Invincible Terrorist." Policy Review no. 
142 (Apr/May, 2007): 57.  
House R.J. "A Theory of Charismatic Leadership." Leadership: The Cutting Edge 
(1977): 305-357.  
Ingram, H. J. "Tracing the Evolutionary Roots of Modern Islamic Radicalism and 
Militancy." (2008).  
Jacquard, Roland. In the Name of Osama Bin Laden:  Global Terrorism & the Bin 
Laden Brotherhood. Rev. and updated ed. Durham, N.C: Duke University 
Press, 2002.  
John. N. Davis. "How is Charisma Routinized? A New Look at an Old Question." 
PhD, Texas Tech University, 2005.  
Johnson, Harry M. Sociology ; A Systematic IntroductionAllied Publishers Pvt. 
Ltd., 2004.  
 142
Kanter, Rosabeth Moss. Commitment and Community: Communes and Utopias 
in Sociological Perspective. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U.P., 1972.  
MacFarquhar, Roderick. Reviewed by Yongyi Song. The Origins of the Cultural 
Revolution, Vol 3: The Coming of the Cataclysm, 1961-1966. Book Review, 
Edited by Song Reviewed by Yongyi. 
http://muse.jhu.edu.libproxy.nps.edu/journals/journal_of_cold_war_studies/v0
04/4.2song.html ed.President and Fellows of Harvard College and the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002. 
Maghraoui, Abdeslam M. “American Foreign Policy and Islamic Renewal,” 
Special Report, United States Institute for Peace, Washington, DC, July, 
2006, www.isip.org, 1. 
Mahmood, Cynthia Keppley. Fighting for Faith and Nation:  Dialogues with Sikh 
Militants. Series in Contemporary Ethnography. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1997.  
Michael, Cole, J. "The Kurtz Factor: Charismatic Leadership in War and 
Terrorism." http://209.85.173.132/search?q=cache:BzWFenjreqoJ:www.cda-
cdai.ca/symposia/2005/Cole.pdf+The+Kurtz+Factor:Charismatic+Leadership
+in+War+and+Terrorism&hl=en&ct=clnk&cd=1&gl=us (accessed January 7, 
2009).  
Mintzberg, Henry. "Structure in 5's: A Synthesis of the Research on Organization 
Design." Management Science 26, no. 3 (Mar., 1980): 322-341.  
Napoleoni, Loretta. Insurgent Iraq:  Al-Zarqawi and the New Generation Seven 
Stories Press, 2005.  
Osama, Laden B. "Online NewsHour: Bin Laden's Fatwa." 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html 
(accessed February 9, 2009).  
Peter Haley. "Rudolph Sohm on Charisma." The Journal of Religion, Vol. 60, no. 
2 (Apr., 1980 ) Vol. 60, no. No.2 (Apr., 1980) (1980): 185.  
Post, Jerrold M. The Mind of the Terrorist: The Psychology of Terrorism from the 
IRA to Al-QaedaPalgrave Macmillan, 2007.  
Press Trust of India - London. "Al Qaeda Warns India of More Mumbai-Style 
Attacks." http://www.rediff.com/news/2009/feb/10mumterror-al-qaeda-warns-
india-of-more-mumbai-style-attacks.htm (accessed March 21, 2009).  
Pribam, K. H. and Raymond Trevor Bradley. "Communication and Stability in 
Social Collectives." Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems 21, no. 1 
(1998): 29.  
 143
Pugh, D. S., D. J. Hickson, and C. R. Hinings. "An Empirical Taxonomy of 
Structures of Work Organizations." Administrative Science Quarterly 14, no. 
1 (Mar 1969): 115-126.  
Raman, B. "The Threat to India." 
http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/may/21raman.htm (accessed March 9, 
2009).  
Rapoport, David C. "The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of 
Terrorism." Current History 100, no. 650 (Dec, 2001): 419.  
Reich, Walter. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States 
of MindWashington, DC:  Woodrow Wilson Center Press ; 1998., 1998.  
Rochlin, James Francis. Vanguard Revolutionaries in Latin America: Peru, 
Colombia, MexicoLynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.  
Rodenbeck, Max. "Review of "the OBL I Know" in the New York Review of 
Books." http://www.peterbergen.com/bergen/articles/details.aspx?id=245 
(accessed April 8, 2009).  
Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror NetworksPhiladelphia:  University of 
Pennsylvania Press, c2004., 2004.  
Scheuer, Michael. "The State of the Jihad, as He might See it." The Washington 
Post, Feb 17, 2008.  
———. "Inside Out." The Atlantic Monthly 295, no. 3 (Apr, 2005): 30.  
Scheuer, Michael, Peter Bergen, Alexis Debat, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and Antony 
T. Sullivan. "9/11/06: Five Years on: A Symposium." The National Interest no. 
85 (Sep/Oct, 2006): 20.  
Scheuer, Reviewed by Michael. "The Plotters Against America; Two New Books 
Disagree Sharply about how Big a Threat Osama Bin Laden and His Allies 
Pose." The Washington Post, Nov 26, 2006.  
Schluchter, Wolfgang. Rationalism, Religion, and Domination:  A Weberian 
Perspective. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.  
Selcan, Hacaoglu. "Kurdish Rebel Leader Ocalan: Turkey's no. 1 Enemy." | 
Article from AP Online | HighBeam Research. 




Shaoguang, Wang. "Failure of Charisma: An Intepretation of the Chinese Cultural 
Revolution." Yale University. 
http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/gpa/wang_files/Charisma.pdf. (accessed January 14, 
2009).  
South Asia Terrorism Portal. "The Timeline Mizoram Insurgency 1967 - 1986." 
http://satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/mizoram/timeline/1966_86.htm 
(accessed  January 14, 2009).  
Swatos, William H.,Jr. "The Disenchantment of Charisma: A Weberian 
Assessment of Revolution in a Rationalized World." Sociological Analysis 42, 
no. 2 (Summer, 1981): 119-136.  
The Time in Partnership with CNN. "The Myth of Guzman." The Time. 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,976603,00.html (accessed 
August 31, 2008).  
Theobald, Robin. "The Role of Charisma in the Development of Social 
Movements / Le Rôle Du Charisme Dans Le Développement Des 
Mouvements Sociaux." Archives Des Sciences Sociales Des Religions 49, 
no. 1 (1980): 83.  
Trice, H. M. and J. M. Beyer. " 
Charisma and its Routinization in Two Social Movement Organizations." 
Research in Organizational Behavior Vol 8, no. 2 (1986): 113-164.  
Tucker, Robert C. "Personality and Political Leadership." Political Science 
Quarterly 92, no. 3 (Autumn, 1977): 383-393.  
———. "The Theory of Charismatic Leadership." Daedalus 97, no. 3, 
Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership (Summer, 1968): 731-756.  
Weber, Max. On Charisma and Institution Building:  Selected Papers. Heritage of 
Sociology., edited by S. N. Eisenstaedt1968.  
Weber, Max, and Talcott Parsons . Max Weber:  The Theory of Social and 
Economic Organization. Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press ; Falcon's Wing Press, 
1947.  
Wilson, Bryan. The Noble Savages: The Primitive Origins of Charisma and its 
Contemporary Survival. Berkeley:  University of California Press, c1975., 
1975.  
Worsley, Peter M. "Cargo Cults." Chap. 11.3, In Ritual and Belief Readings in the 
Anthropology of Religion, edited by David Hicks, 469. McGraw-Hill, 2001.  
 145
Yassin, Musharbash. "What Al Qaeda really Wants: An Islamic Caliphate in 
Seven Easy Steps - eBaum's World Forum." 
http://forum.ebaumsworld.com/showthread.php?t=144027 (accessed 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 147
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
Dr. Nancy Roberts 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
Dr Erik Jansen 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
Dr. Michael Freeman 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
Dr Lee Doowan 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 








Director MT 16 
Army Headquarters, SenaBhavan 
New Delhi, 110010, India 
